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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co.:
Abandonment of Appeal in North Carolina
It is a well settled rule in North Carolina that appealing a case' removes
it from the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thereafter, while the appeal is
pending, the trial judge is without further authority over the case. 2 The
general rule, however, is subject to the exception or qualification that "the
trial judge, after notice and on proper showing, may adjudge the appeal has
been abandoned" and thereby regain jurisdiction of the cause. 3 In the recent
case of Bowen v. Hodge Motor .Co. ,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court
I. N.C.R. App. P. 3(a), (b), enacted in June 1975, continues the tiaditional code practice
that permitted an appeal to be taken from judgment either orally at trial or by written notice.
See Code of Civil Procedure of N.C. § 300 (1868) (presently codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-279 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
2. American Floor Mach. Co. v. Dixon, 260 N.C. 732,735-36, 133 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1963);
Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 375, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947); Bledsoe v.
Nixon, 69 N.C. 81 (1873); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (1969); 2 A. MCINTOSH. NORTH CAROUNA
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1799, at 236-37 (1956).
The result of this rule is that oral notice of appeal given in open court forecloses postverdict motions for relief from judgment at the trial court level that would otherwise have been
available prior to the appeal. N.C.R. App. P. 3 points out the timetable advantage of giving
written notice of appeal rather than oral notice. Written notice of appeal must be given within 10
days after the entry of judgment. N.C.R. App. P. 3(c), however, contains an important
innovation derived from FED. R. App. P. 4(a) which "causes the running of appeal time to be
tolled by the filing of a post-verdict moti6n uiider either Rule 50, 52, or 59 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, with the period recommencing upon the entry of an order upon the motion." N.C.
App. P. 3, Drafting Comm. Note. Prior to the enactment of rule 3(c), this effect was given only
to N.C.R. Civ. P. 59 (iew trial) motions. N.C.R. App. P. 3, Drafting Comm. Note. Thus, giving
written notice of appeal allows time to consider alternate post-verdict motions whereas immediate oral notice of appeal removes jurisdiction from the trial court and forecloses postverdict motions at the trial court level. Such motions may nevertheless be entertained if the
appellant abandons his appeal or falls within the term rule exception to the general rule. See
note 3 and accompanying text infra. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1448 & Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977) (trial court retains jurisdiction after a criminal defendant has given oral
or written notice of appeal for any time remaining in the 10 day appeal period). The problem,
inherent in oral notice of appeal, does not arise in the federal courts, which permit only written
notice of appeal. See FED. R. App. P. 3(a).
3. American Floor Mach. Co. v. Dixon, 260 N.C. 732,735-36, 133 S.E.2d 659,662 (1963).
In addition, there are two other exceptions to the general rule. "[ihe trial judge retains
jurisdiction over the cause (1) during the session in which the judgment appealed from was
rendered [the term rule exception] and (2) for the purpose of settling the case on appeal."
Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 635-36, 234 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1977); see Hoke v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 375-76, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-283 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (second exception); N.C.R. App. P. 11(c).
4. 292 N.C. 633, 234 S.E.2d 748 (1977).
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clarified whether an appearance of the parties before the trial court on a postverdict motion constitutes an abandonment of appeal. The Bowen court held
that plaintiffs' motion for a voluntary dismissal and the appearance of the
parties at a hearing on the motion pending an appeal did not constitute an
abandonment of the appeal and consequently did not revest jurisdiction of
5
the cause in the trial judge.

Plaintiffs in Bowen brought an action for property damage to their
automobile allegedly resulting from defendant's negligent repair. 6 The trial
court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of
plaintiffs' case and again at the close of all the evidence. On the following
day, the judge reconsidered and granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. Plaintiffs subsequently gave notice of appeal in open court. 7 Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a rule 41(a)(2)8 motion for voluntary dismissal without

prejudice. 9 After the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for voluntary
dismissal,' 0 defendant filed a motion to vacate the order allowing the
dismissal on the ground that plaintiffs' notice of appeal from the directed
verdict divested the trial court of jurisdiction." Defendant appealed the
5. Id. at 638, 234 S.E.2d at 751.
6. Id. at 634, 234 S.E.2d at 748.
7. Id. at 634, 234 S.E.2d at 749.
8. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l) provides that plaintiffs have a right to a voluntary dismissal
without order of the court "(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the plaintiff rests
his case, or; (ii)by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action." Rule 41(a)(2) provides that, except as provided in 41(a)(1), "an action or any claim
• . . shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the judge and upon
such terms and conditions as justice requires." Id. 41(a)(2).
9. The N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) motion was grounded upon additional evidence that had
not been presented at trial and that was in part not known to plaintiffs' attorney at that time. 292
N.C. at 635, 234 S.E.2d at 749.
10. On appeal in Bowen, the question whether a rule 41(a)(2) motion could be granted
after the entry of a directed verdict was raised. Although the supreme court did not reach the
issue, the court of appeals concluded that a voluntary dismissal could be granted after the entry
of a directed verdict, noting that "[t]he rule prescribes no time limit on the right of the plaintiff
to move for a voluntary dismissal with the court's permission" and that there was no showing
that the trial judge had abused his discretion when he granted the motion. 29 N.C. App. 463,
466-67, 224 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1976). In support of its conclusion, the court of appeals cited Kelly
v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 158, 179 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1971) (stating in dicta
that "[w]hen a motion for a directed verdict . . '. is granted, the defendant is entitled to
judgment unless the court permits a voluntary dismissal of the action under Rule 41 (a)(2)"), and
King v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100, 107, 181 S.E.2d 400, 404-05 (1971) (after sustaining the trial court's
grant of a motion for a directed verdict, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court
for the purpose of permitting plaintiff to consider making a motion for a voluntary dismissal). 29 N.C. App. at 466-67, 224 S.E.2d at 702. See generally W. SIHtUFORD, NORTH
CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 41-3 to -5 (1975).
11. 292 N.C. at 635, 234 S.E.2d at 749. After plaintiffs' notice of appeal and the court's
direction to defendant to present judgment, the notation "Court expires" appears in the court's
minutes. Id. The supreme court upheld the court of appeals' decision that the session of court
had adjourned. Since the session of court at which the appeal was entered had ended, the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion under the term rule exception. Id. at 63839, 234 S.E.2d at 751; see note 3 supra.
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order allowing plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal and the denial of his motion to
dismiss the order for lack of jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding on the basis of the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Sink v. Easter,12 that plaintiffs' rule
41(a)(2) motion and the subsequent appearance of the parties at the hearing
on the motion constituted an abandonment of plaintiffs' appeal from the
directed verdict. 13 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, pointing to Wiggins v. Bunch' 4 as the controlling case. 15 The
supreme court also explained that the court of appeals' reliance on Sink was
misplaced and that Sink "should not be interpreted as holding that the mere
filing of a motion . . . and the appearance at a hearing thereon16 constitutes
an abandonment of the prior appeal, nothing else appearing."
Historically, the qualification that a trial judge can, upon proper showing, judge an appeal abandoned applied principally to situations in which an
appellant failed to prosecute his appeal. 17 When an appellant had not timely
docketed the appeal, the appellee could either move in the supreme court to
docket and dismiss the appeal according to rule II, section 7 of the Rules of
Practice in the Supreme Court of North Carolina 18 or have the superior
court, upon proper notice, determine that the appellant had abandoned his
appeal and proceed in the case as if no appeal had been taken. 19 The
alternative of having the appeal adjudged abandoned at the trial court level
was a product of case law; 10 the essential procedures constituting an abandonment were not delineated as they were for the docket and dismiss rule.
12. 288 N.C. 183, 217 S.E.2d 532 (1975).
13. 29 N.C. App. 463, 466, 224 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1976). The court of appeals also relied on

Reavis v. Campbell, 27 N.C. App. 231, 218 S.E.2d 873 (1975), which followed Sink in holding
that, pending appeal from summary judgment, the hearing on plaintiff's subsequent motion to

set aside summary judgment constituted an adjudication by the trial court that plaintiff's prior
appeal had been abandoned.
14. 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971); see text accompanying notes 49-56 infra.

15. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750; see text accompanying note 57 infra.
16. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
17. See Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266, 267 (1885).

18. N.C. Sup. Ct. R. II, § 7, 89 N.C. 598 (1884), stated that:
If the appellant in a civil action shall fail to bring up and file a transcript of the record

before the call of causes from the district from which it comes is concluded during the
week appropriated to the district, at a term of this court in which such transcript is
required to be filed, the appellee, on exhibiting the certificate of the clerk of the court

from which the appeal comes, or a certified transcript of the record.

. . may

move to

have the appeal docketed and dismissed at appellant's cost, with leave to the appellant
during the term and after notice to the appellee, to apply for the re-docketing of the
cause.
Avery v. Pritchardincorrectly cited id. II, § 8 as the docket and dismiss procedure. 93 N.C.

266, 267 (1885). Rule II, § 8 provided that an appeal should not be reinstated until appellant paid
or offered to pay appellee's costs of having the appeal dismissed under § 7.
19. Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266, 267 (1885).

20. Avery v. Pritchardwas one of the first cases to state the abandonment rule. See id.
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The trial courts, however, consistent with rule II, section 7,21 have required
that an appellee seeking an adjudication of abandonment prove that the
record and transcript were not docketed on time. 22 The rationale behind both

procedures was that an appellee should have the fruit of his judgment
promptly and thus is entitled to have an appeal that was taken but not
prosecuted dismissed. 23
The modern counterpart to the procedures allowing an appellee to
dismiss an appeal for failure of the .appellant to comply with the rules for
prosecuting an appeal is rule 25 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 24 whichhas its origin in part in rule II, section*7 of the Rules of

Practice in the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 5 Rule 25 dispenses with
the docket and dismiss procedure but continues the traditional authority of
the trial court to dismiss appeals prior to docketing upon an appropriate
showing. The rule makes explicit what was implicit in the abandonment
procedure: first, that the method for having an appeal adjudged abandoned
is a motion to dismiss by the appellee; and second, that the "proper
showing" to support the motion consists of affidavits or copies of the record
showing appellant's failure to take timely action or otherwise prosecute the
appeal.26
There are no provisions governing dismissal of an appeal by an appellant in either the old Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of North
21. See note 18 supra.
22. See Pentuff v. Park, 195 N.C. 609, 611, 143 S.E. 139, 140 (1928).
23. Jordan v. Simmons, 175 N.C. 537, 540, 95 S.E. 919, 921 (1918) (concurring opinion)
(attacking failure to perfect appeals as a cause of delay in the qourts and endorsing adjudications of abandonment as the speedier of the two methods); Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266, 267
(1885).
24. The North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure supersede the Rules of Practice in
the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the Rules of Practice in the Appellate Court of North
Carolina. See 4A N.C. GEN. STAT. app. I (Cum. Supp. 1977). N.C.R. App. P. 25-states:
If after giving notice of appeal from any court, commission, or commissioner the
appellant shall fail within the times allowed by these rules or by order of court to take
any action required to present the appeal for decision, the appeal may on motion of
any other party be dismissed. Prior to the docketing of an appeal in the appellate court
motions to dismiss are made to the court, commission, or commissioner from which
appeal has been taken; after an appeal has been docketed in an appellate court motions
to dismiss are made to that court.
The Drafting Committee comments that the "rule states a blanket authority in the appropriate
courts to dismiss cases on appeal for failure to take any timely action in the appellate process,
from serving proposed case on appeal to filing the record on appeal" except that failure to file
timely briefs is dealt with separately. Id., Drafting Comm. Note. The rule also allows the court
to excuse untimely action for good cause. This replaces the reinstatement procedure of N.C.
Sup. Ct. R. II, §§ 7, 8, 89 N.C. 598 (1884); see note 18 supra.
25. N.C.R. App. P. 25, Drafting Comm. Note. N.C. Sup. Ct. R. II, §§ 7, 8 was renumbered as rules 17 and 18 in 1889. See 104 N.C. 633 (1889). Rules 17 and 18 continued basically
unchanged and were incorporated as N.C. Ct. App. R. 17, 18, 1 N.C. App. 632, 639 (1968).
26. N.C.R. App. P. 25.
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Carolina, 27 the Rules of Practice in the Appellate Court of North Carolina 28
or the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 29 Furthermore, there is
little early case law developing the procedure by which an appellant could
abandon an appeal. Appellants can, nevertl)eless, abandon their appeals.
Since 1947, the original limitation of the abandonment rule to appellees has
apparently been discarded. 30 Both appellants and appellees can prove abandonment and thereby revest jurisdiction in the trial court. Moreover, the
"proper showing" requirement of the abandonment rule has been extended
to appellants. 31 Thus, an appellant could, in the discretion of the trial court,
withdraw his appeal by making application for leave to dismiss and by
showing that the appellee would not be prejudiced by the withdrawal.
The first indication by the North Carolina Supreme Court that a motion
in the trial court by an appellant while his appeal was pending could
constitute an abandonment of that appeal came in Leggett v. SmithDouglass Co. 32 Plaintiffs in Leggett appealed an order of the trial court
sustaining defendants' demurrer and dismissing the action. Plaintiff-appellants gave notice of appeal to the supreme court but subsequently failed to
draft and serve a copy of the case on defendants; the appeal was never
perfected.3 3 Thereafter, appellants took a voluntary nonsuit 34 in superior
court and instituted another action against defendants. The state supreme
court held that under those circumstances "the taking of a voluntary nonsuit
27. 254 N.C. 783 (1961) (superseded 1975).
28. 1 N.C. App. 632 (1968) (superseded 1975).
29. But cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1450 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (express statutory authority
for withdrawal of appeal by a criminal defendant).
30. In Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 376, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947),
where the general rule and its exceptions were first consolidated, the abandonment rule was
cited as a qualification to the general rule that jurisdiction is removed from the trial court
pending appeal without reference to who may invoke the rule or under what conditions it may
be invoked. Prior to this time the abandonment rule as set forth in Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C.
266 (1885); see text accompanying note 17 supra, had been cited only in cases in which the
appellee was dismissing an appeal not prosecuted by the appellant. Avery was cited only once

after Hoke. See Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 511, 78 S.E.2d 334, 339 (1953). Thereafter,
Hoke was cited for the proposition that an appellant could abandon his appeal at the trial court
prior to docketing. See, e.g., McDowell v. Town of Kure Beach, 251 N.C. 818, 112 S.E.2d 390
(1960); State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959); Sinclair v. Moore Cent. R.R., 228
N.C. 389, 45 S.E.2d 555 (1947). The recent litigation raising the abandonment issue has resulted
from appellants' attempts to abandon appeal in order to seek other affirmative relief at the trial
court level. See text accompanying notes 6-11 & 48-53 infra.
31. McDowell v. Town of Kure Beach, 251 N.C. 818, 821, 824-25, 112 S.E.2d 390, 393,
395 (1960); accord, Town of Davidson v. Stough, 258 N.C. 23, 24, 127 S.E.2d 762, 763 (1962).
32. 257 N.C. 646, 127 S.E.2d 222 (1962).
33. Id. at 648, 127 S.E.2d at 223.
34. The nonsuit was pursuant to former § 1-224,2 Hen. IV c. 7 (1400), as adopted by Rev.
Code of N.C. ch. 31, § 110 (1855) (formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-224 (1954))
(repealed 1967). Prior to the adoption of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff
was allowed to take a voluntary nonsuit at any time before the verdict as long as the defendant
had not asserted a counterclaim or a demand for affirmative relief. Id.

578

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

before the clerk of the superior court is tantamount to an abandonmelit or
withdraWal of the appeal." 35 The notion that an appeal could be abandoned
without a formal motion for abandonment was later endorsed in Sink v.
37
Easter36 and relied upon by the court of appeals in Bowen.
Sink v. Easter involved a complex procedural tangle 38 that the Bowen
court likened to a "Gordian knot." ' 39 On March 21, 1974 the trial judge
entered a judgment granting defendant's rule 60(b)(6) 40 motion and dismissing plaintiff's case for lack of jurisdiction. In response, plaintiff filed a rule
60(b)(1) and (2) motion for relief from judgment on grounds of mistake,
inadvertance and newly discovered evidence. 41 On the same day, the trial
judge filed a Correction of Judgment and an order denying plaintiff's rule
60(b) motion.42 Plaintiff gave notice of appeal from both of these actions by
the trial court. 43 Thereafter, the trial judge, acting on his own motion, 4 set
35. 257 N.C. at 648, 127 S.E.2d at 224; accord, Williams v. Asheville Contracting Co., 257
N.C. 769, 770, 127 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1962) (per curiam).
36. 288 N.C. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542.
37. 29 N.C. App. 463, 465-66, 224 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1976). The supreme court in Bowen,
however, summarily distinguished Leggett. Leggett "dealt with [North -Carolina's] old voluntary nonsuit practice under which plaintiff had an absolute right voluntarily to nonsuit his action
without prejudice up to the time a verdict was rendered against him." 292 N.C. at 638, 234
S.E.2d at 751. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), which was at issue in Bowen., does not convey an
absolute right to dismiss the action without prejudice. The court further distinguished Leggett
on the basis that plaintiff had failed to perfect his appeal prior to taking the nonsuit. Although in
Williams v. Asheville Contracting Co., 257 N.C. 769, 127 S.E.2d 554 (1962) (per curiam), a case
following Leggett, the time for perfecting the appeal had not expired at the time plaintiff filed a
nonsuit, the Bowen court pointed out that plaintiff thereafter failed to perfect the appeal and it
was subsequently dismissed by the supreme court. 292 N.C. at 638, 234 S.E.24'at 751.
38. Sink involved two actions c9mmenced on September 3, 1971, for personal injuries and
medical expenses resulting from an automobile accident. One action was instituted by Sherry
Sink for injuries and expenses incurred subsequent to her majority; the other was instituted by
Sherry Sink's father, James Sink, for Sherry's medical expenses prior to her majority. James
Sink's action was litigated and ultimately remanded by the North Carolina Supreme Court with
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency of service of process. Sink v.
Easter, 284 NC. 555, 202 S.E.2d 138 (1974).
Sherry Sink's action remained in limbo until after James Sink's action was dismissed.
Defendant then filed a N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (relief from judgment) motion to dismiss Sherry
Sink's action on the ground that the court's prior denial of defendant's rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss filed in March 1972 was "irregular and void" by reason of the decision in James Sink's
action. Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. at 188, 217 S.E.2d at 535. The Sink court pointed out that
defendant's rule 60(b)(6) motion was mislabeled since it was made in response to the denial of
defendant's rule 12(b)(5) (insufficiency of service) motion, an interlocutory order, while rule
60(b) applies only to final judgments. The Sink court elected, therefore, to treat defendant's
rule 60(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel and to treat
the trial court's granting of the rule 60(b)(6) motion as a granting of a rule 56 motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 196-97, 217 S.E.2d at 540-41.
39. 292 N.C. at 636-37, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
40. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); see note 38 supra.
41. 288 N.C. at 190, 217 S.E.2d at 536.
42. Id. at 190, 217 S.E.2d at 536-37.
43. Id. at 190, 217 S.E.2d at 537 (appeal from corrected judgment granting defendant's
N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion); id. at 191, 217 S.E.2d at 537 (appeal from denial of plaintiff's
N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l), (2) motion).
44. Since this action took place at a new session of court, the trial judge no longer had
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aside his order denying plaintiff's rule 60(b) motion because he had erred in
determining that he was without discretion to consider the motion. 45 The
trial judge proceeded, over defendant's objection, to conduct a hearing on
plaintiff's motion.
The question before the supreme court in Sink was whether plaintiff
had properly abandoned her appeal from the denial of the rule 60(b) motion
in order to revest jurisdiction in the trial court. In answering this question
affirmatively, the supreme court construed the hearing on the rule 60(b)
motion attended by both parties as constituting an adjudication by the trial
court that plaintiff, by appearing at the hearing, gave proper notice of her
intention to abandon her prior appeal from the denial of her motion. 46 The
court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider plaintiff's
60(b) motion.4 7
The supreme court in Bowen, in rejecting Sink's holding that the
proceedings alone constituted an abandonment of appeal,4 8 gave controlling
authority to an earlier decision, Wiggins v. Bunch.49 The issue in Wiggins
was whether motions filed pursuant to rules 5950 and 60,51 pending appeal,
affected the general rule that an appeal removes the case from the jurisdiction of the trial court. 52 The trial court had granted defendants' motion to
dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence; plaintiff gave notice of appeal in
open court. Nearly two months after the judgment of dismissal, plaintiff
moved to set aside the judgment and for a new trial pursuant to rules 59 and
60 on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. After a hearing on the
motion, the trial court set aside the dismissal and granted plaintiff a new
trial.5 3
The supreme court held that, because the time limit for a rule 59 motion
is ten days after the entry of judgment, 54 rule 59 did not apply and that if
jurisdiction of the case under the term rule exception. Id. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542; see note 3

supra.
45. 288 N.C. at 190-91, 217 S.E.2d at 536. "As is recognized in many cases, a motion for
relief under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and appellate
review is limited to determining whether the court abused its discretion." Id. at 198,217 S.E.2d
at 541.

46. Id. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542.
47. The events in Sink were further complicated because plaintiff gave notice of appeal on
two issues. See text accompanying notes 62-71 infra.
48. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 749.

49. 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971); see text accompanying note 14 supra.
50. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59; see note 2 supra.
51. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60.

52. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
53. 280 N.C. at 107, 184 S.E.2d at 879.
54. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59(b) states: "A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10
days after entry of the judgment."

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

plaintiff were entitled to any relief it would have to be under rule 60.55
Wiggins concluded that the general rule that an appeal divests the trial court
of jurisdiction was not changed by the time limits for moving under rules 59
56
and 60 of the newly adopted North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hence, even though plaintiff was within the time limit of rule 60 when he
made his motion, the prior appeal had removed jurisdiction from the trial
court, and the trial court was, therefore, without authority to vacate the
judgment.
In giving controlling authority to Wiggins, Bowen emphasized that,
although the court in Wiggins recognized the qualification to the general
rule that an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, 57 it found no
occasion to apply the qualification in that case. 5 8 Instead, Wiggins held that
motions filed pursuant to rules 59 or 60 could not properly be addressed to
the trial court pending appeal. 59 Moreover, according to Bowen, "[t]here
was no suggestion [in Wiggins] that the mere filing of the motions and the
appearance of the parties for a hearing thereon constituted an abandonment
of the appeal by the moving party.' '6 If the filing of the motions and the
appearance of the parties at a hearing did constitute an abandonment, the
Wiggins court could have found an abandonment of appeal in that case. The
Bowen court attempted to reconcile the apparent conflict between the
implication in Wiggins that plaintiff's appearance at a hearing on his rule 59
and 60 motions did not constitute an abandonment of appeal and the express
55. 280 N.C. at 109, 184 S.E.2d at 880. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) states: "The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this section does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation." Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on
the grounds of newly discovered evidence under rule 60(b)(2). 280 N.C. at 107, 184 S.E.2d at
879.
56. 280 N.C. at 111, 184 S.E.2d at 882. The court was guided by interpretations of the
nearly identical Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 59, 60. See Norman v.
Young, 422 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1970) (when defendant filed an appeal before arguing his FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) motion, the case was taken out of the trial court's jurisdiction); Switzer v. Marzall,
95 F. Supp. 721 (D.D.C. 1951) (when a motion for a new trial is filed and an appeal is taken
thereafter, the case is removed from the trial court which no longer has jurisdiction over the
rule 60(b) motion); Daniels v. Goldberg, 8 F.R.D. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (the district court has
power to correct clerical errors in the record before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court
and thereafter with leave of the appellate court under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a), but this does not
confer on the district court the power to vacate a judgment after an appeal has been filed);
cf. Keyser v. Farr, 105 U.S. 265 (1881); Draper v. Davis, 102 U.S. 370 (1880) (in pre-Rules
setting, after an appeal was allowed and security for appeal taken, the lower court was without
jurisdiction).
57. See 280 N.C. at 108, 184 S.E.2d at 880.
58. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
59. 280 N.C. at 111, 184 S.E.2d at 882. Plaintiff in Bowen, by making a N.C.R. Civ. P.
41(a)(2) motion for a voluntary dismissal grounded on newly discovered evidence rather than a
rule 59 motion, may have been trying to avoid the effect of Wiggins. Sink, discussed at text
accompanying notes 38-47 supra, was not decided until several weeks after the 41(a)(2) motion
was made in Bowen.
60. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750.

1978]

ABANDONMENT OF APPEAL

statement in Sink that the appearance of plaintiff at a hearing on her 60(b)
by narrowing Sink in light of later
motion did constitute an abandonment
61
procedural events in the latter case.
In doing so, however, the supreme court has apparently oversimplified
the analysis in Sink. The Bowen court treated the procedural events in Sink
as if there were only one appeal and interpreted Sink as holding that
plaintiff's abandonment of her rule 60(b) motion was effective only in
relation to plaintiff's later express abandonment of the same appeal.6 2 The
Sink court, however, had expressly maintained that it was "important to
remember" 63 that two appeals were pending: an appeal from the order of
dismissal and an appeal from the order denying plaintiff's rule 60(b) mo65
tion.64 Plaintiff in Sink did not expressly abandon her rule 60(b) appeal,
but rather expressly abandoned her appeal from the judgment of dismissal
subsequent to the initial, implied abandonment. 66 Therefore, even if the
appeal from the rule 60(b) motion was effectively abandoned by the appearance of the parties at the hearing, the trial court in Sink still did not have
sufficient jurisdiction to grant the rule 60(b) motion because the first appeal
from the judgment of dismissal was still pending.
When the Sink court held that the hearing on the rule 60(b) motion
constituted an abandonment of the appeal from the denial of that motion, it
did not claim that the hearing on the rule 60(b) motion also constituted an
abandonment of the appeal from the judgment of dismissal. On the contrary,
Sink recognized that after the trial court regained jurisdiction over the rule
60(b) motion by virtue of the abandonment, it then faced the only issue that
was before the court in Wiggins-the effect of a pending appeal on the trial
court's power to grant relief under the 60(b) motion. 67 Following the
practice of the federal courts, 68 the Sink court suggested that it could have
61. Id. at 636-37, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
62. "Plaintiff's position relative to her appeal on 1 April 1974 [the proceedings at which

the trial court reconsidered its prior denial of plaintiff's rule 60(b) motion] must be considered in
the context of her later express abandonment of that appeal and the court's order allowing the
abandonment." Id. at 637-38, 234 S.E.2d at 750 (second emphasis added).
63. 288 N.C. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542.
64. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
65. 288 N.C. at 191, 198, 217 S.E.2d at 535-36, 542; see text accompanying notes 45-47
supra.
66. 288 N.C. at 200, 217 S.E.2d at 543.
67. Id. at 199, 217 S.E.2d 542; see 280 N.C. at 110, 184 S.E.2d at 881.
68. Earlier federal cases held that the district court had no power to consider a rule 60(b)
motion pending appeal and required the party making the motion to first present his grounds to
the appellate court which could remand th&case or give permission to the district court to rule
on the motion. I I C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2873, at 26365 (1973). The practice of making a 60(b) motion in the appellate court is referred to in Wiggins,
where the court stated that plaintiffs had failed to make the 60(b) motion in the appellate court
within the time limit of the rule. 280 N.C. at 111, 184 S.E.2d at 882; accord, Rhodes v.
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treated the order granting plaintiff relief under rule 60(b) as a " 'clear
indication' " of how the trial court would rule were the cause remanded to
the trial court. 69 Remanding the cause became unnecessary, however, because plaintiff expressly abandoned her appeal from judgment of dismissal
prior to the granting of the rule 60(b) motion. 70 The Sink court stated that
only after plaintiff expressly abandoned her appeal from dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction by successfully filing a motion to withdraw the appeal was
the trial judge revested with jurisdiction over the "entire cause.''71 It was
not until after this motion to withdraw the appeal from the judgment of
dismissal was granted that the trial court ruled on plaintiff's rule 60(b)
motion, set aside the judgment of dismissal and denied defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Much of the problem in Sink arises from an overly broad interpretation
that in all circumstances proceedings on a post-verdict motion made in the
trial court pending a prior appeal constitute an abandonment of that appeal.
Bowen was correct in holding that this is not a proper interpretation of Sink
and that the implied abandonment in Sink must be viewed in light of its
procedural context. 72 Bowen, however, by failing to distinguish between
the two appeals in Sink, derived the rule that an express abandonment is
required in all cases in order to revest jurisdiction in the trial court. 73 This
holding does not adequately account for the relationship between the proceedings constituting an abandonment and the later procedural events in
Sink. The Sink rule allowing the proceedings on the rule 60(b) motion to
constitute an abandonment is limited to the situation where there is an appeal
both from judgment and from a rule 60(b) motion properly made in the trial
court prior to appeal and where the abandonment only vests jurisdiction in
the trial court for the purpose of "reconsidering" the rle 60(b) motion
pending either remand or express abandonment of the still pending appeal
from judgment. 74
To hold in that narrow context, as Sink does, that the proceedings
Henderson, 14 N.C. App. 404, 409, 188 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1972); A. MCINTOSH, supra note 2,
§ 1800(7), at 242 & § 1720, at 94 (1956 & Supp. 1970).
Other cases developed a procedure, recommended by Wright and Miller, C. WRIG;HT &
A. MILLER, supra § 2873, at 256-66, and suggested by Sink, 288 N.C. at 199-200, 217 S.E.2d at

543, whereby the district court could consider the rule 60(b) motion and, if it were inclined to
grant it, application could be made to the appellate court for remand. The result is that while the

district court could deny the motion, it could not grant it until there had been a remand. 7
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60:30(2), at 420-22 (2d ed. 1970).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

288 N.C. at 199-200, 217 S.E.2d at 543.
Id.
Id. at 200, 217 S.E.2d at 543.
See text accompanying note 61 supra.
See text accompanying note 62 supra.
See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
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constituted an abandonment of the rule 60(b) appeal is not inconsistent with
Wiggins, in which the rule 60(b) motion was not made in the trial court until
after an appeal from judgment had been taken. 75 The trial court in Wiggins
never had jurisdiction over the rule 60(b) motion that could be revested.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction purportedly conveyed by the proceedings on
the motion was not to reconsider the post-verdict motion but to rule on the
pending appeal. Thus, the court's conclusion in Bowen that the filing of a
rule 41(a)(2) motion and the appearance at a hearing did not constitute an
abandonment of appeal absent express abandonment of the appeal and a
judgment of the trial court to that effect elaborates the holding in Wiggins
and clarifies the requirements for abandonment of appeal by appellants.
The need to abandon an appeal in order to seek post-verdict relief in the
76
trial court could be reduced by more cautious use of oral notice of appeal.
When it is necessary to abandon an appeal, any remaining uncertainty
surrounding the procedures for voluntary abandonment by an appellant
could be eliminated by adopting a provision for voluntary dismissal by
appellants similar to that governing dismissals by appellees. 77 The drafters
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have recognized the need for
such a provision 78 and perhaps Wiggins, Bowen and Sink reveal the need
for such a provision in North Carolina.
SUZANNE MORGAN LEARY

75. See text accompanying notes 49-56- supra.
76. See note 2 supra.

77. See note 24 and text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
78. FED. R. App. P. 42 provides:
(a) Dismissal in the District Court.
If an appeal has not been docketed, the appeal may be dismissed by the district
court upon the filing in that court of a stipulation for dismissal signed by all the parties,
or upon motion and notice by the appellant.
(b) Dismissal in the Court of Appeals.
If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding shall sign and file with the clerk of
the court of appeals an agreement that the proceeding be dismissed, specifying the
terms as to payment of costs, and shall pay whatever fees are due, the clerk shall enter
the case dismissed, but no mandate or other process shall issue without an order of the
court. An appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant upon such terms as may
be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court.

Constitutional Law-Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: First Amendment Limitations on FCC Regulation of Offensive Broadcasts
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has enormous power
over broadcasters, and it has not hesitated to use that power to enforce its
own views of what constitutes good radio and television programming.

Among the FCC's goals has been the expurgation of "offensive" language
from the airwaves. To this end, the FCC has used its powers to assess
forfeitures, 1 to deny license renewal applications 2 and to exert indirect
pressure on licensees. 3 The FCC's efforts have not been limited to obscene
speech. The Commission has argued that the unique nature of the broadcasting medium justifies restrictions, even on speech that does not meet the
Supreme Court's definition of obscenity.4 In PacificaFoundation v. FCC,5
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed an
FCC order 6 prohibiting the broadcast of certain "offensive" words. The
court held that the order violated both the Communications Act of 19347 and
the first amendment. Although the court left open the general question
whether the FCC can ever prohibit the broadcast of nonobscene speech, the
opinions in the case suggest that such Commission action will not be upheld.
On October 30, 1973, radio station WBAI in New York City was
broadcasting its regularly scheduled "Lunchpail" program. 8 As part of the
program, the host played a prerecorded monologue called "Filthy Words," 9
1. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970) authorizes the Commission to assess fines, called "forfeitures," against licensees. Such a forfeiture was assessed for the broadcast of indecent language
in WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
2. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C.2d 250 (1962), reconsideration denied, 34
F.C.C.2d 101 (1963), aff'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d
534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
3. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397,407-10 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (Bazelon, C.J., stating why he voted to grant rehearing en banc). The FCC's own proud
description of how it browbeat the networks into adopting the "Family Viewing" period is
found in FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT,
INDECENT, AND OBSCENE MATERIAL, 51 F.C.C.2d 418,420-24 (1975). Its tactics on that occasion
were later held to violate the first amendment. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. FCC, 423 F,
Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
4. See text accompanying notes 120-24 infra.
5. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 715 (1978) (No. 77-528), rev'g 56
F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
6. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
7. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The
section involved in Pacifica was 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
8. This was a live discussion program that focused on a different topic each day. It
involved commentary from a host and discussions between him and listeners who called in. On
that day the topic was contemporary society's attitudes toward language. 56 F.C.C.2d at 95.
9. The monologue was cut five of side two of the album "George Carlin, Occupation:
FOOLE," (Little David Records, LD 1005). It was broadcast at approximately two p.m. on a
Tuesday. Id. A transcript of the monologue appears as an appendix to Judge Leventhal's
dissenting opinion. 556 F.2d at 37 app.
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in which comedian George Carlin discussed "the words you couldn't say on
the public . . . airwaves, . . . the ones you definitely couldn't say,
ever." 10 Because the monologue included numerous repetitions of those
words, WBAI preceded the broadcast with a warning that the language
11
might offend some listeners.
One listener complained to the FCC. 12 The FCC responded by issuing
an order banning the broadcast of the words listed by Carlin. 13 It did so on
the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1464,14 a criminal statute that outlaws the
broadcast of obscene, indecent or profane language. Arguing that the restriction would not stifle free speech, the FCC said that few words were
indecent and that even indecent words "conceivably might be broadcast"1
16
late at night, when children would not be listening.
Pacifica Foundation, holder of WBAI's broadcasting license, appealed
17
the order. The court of appeals reversed the FCC by a vote of two to one.
Judge Tamm, who wrote for the court, voted to reverse the order on the
ground that it violated 47 U.S.C. § 326,18 which denies the FCC the power
10. 556 F.2d at 38 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Judge Leventhal). "'The original
seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.'" Id. (quoting
the Carlin monologue, see note 9 supra).
11. /Id. at 11.
12. Id. This listener heard the broadcast while driving in his car with his young son. There
were no other complaints to either the FCC or WBAI. Id.
13. The order declared "that words such as 'fuck,' 'shit,' 'piss,' 'motherfucker,'
'cocksucker,' 'cunt' and 'tit' depict sexual and excretory activities and organs in a manner
patently offensive by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium and are
accordingly 'indecent' when broadcast on radio or television." 56 F.C.C.2d at 99. In a later
clarification, the FCC stated that it would not hold licensees responsible for offensive language
used in live news broadcasts of public events. "Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration"
of a Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 n.1 (1976).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both." In addition, 47 id. § 503(b)(1)(E) empowers the Commission
to impose forfeitures on licensees for violations of § 1464.
15. "[D]uring the late evening hours such words conceivably might be broadcast, with
sufficient warning to unconsenting adults provided the-programs in which they are used have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 56 F.C.C.2d at 100. Elsewhere in its
opinion the Commission stated this exception somewhat differently: "'WThen the number of
children in the audience is reduced to a minimum, for example during the late evening hours, a
different standard might conceivably be used. . . . [W]e would . . . consider whether the
material has serious . . . value ....
" Id. at 98. Neither formulation commits the FCC to
making any exception at all. The Commission continued to hedge in "Petition for Clarification
or Reconsideration" of a Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C.2d 892
(1976): "We intimated that such language could be broadcast. . . when the number of children
in the audience was reduced to a minimum. . . . Having said this, we will not comment on the
various hypothetical situations posed ....
" Id. at 893.
16. The declaratory order was not accompanied by any attempt to assess a fine against
WBAI. 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
17. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Each judge on the three-judge panel wrote an opinion.
18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over-the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
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of censorship. He noted that the speech in question was not obscene 19 under
the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,20 but he
did not pass on the Commission's argument that "indecent" speech was not
constitutionally protected. Even if this were so, he concluded, the order was
overbroad and vague. 2
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon agreed that section 326
had been violated on its face. 22 Nevertheless, he did not base his decision on
that statute because he thought the scope of the protection afforded by
23
section 326 was limited to that already provided by the first amendment.
He therefore reached the constitutional issue and decided that Carlin's seven
words would have been protected by the first amendment had they been
disseminated through any other medium 24 and that none of the differences
between broadcasting and other media justified greater restrictions on such
5
language?
Judge Leventhal dissented, in part because he interpreted the FCC
order as prohibiting only the reiterated use of the offensive words in the
early afternoon. 26 He thought such regulation valid under Miller,27 especially when used to protect children who might be in the audience. 28 While
admitting to some discomfort over the inexactness of the order, he
concluded that this was not a serious problem because judicial review was
29
available to safeguard constitutionally protected speech.
Section 1464 lists three kinds of speech that may not be broadcast: the
19. 556 F.2d at 16.

20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test of obscenity has three elements:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)

whether the work,

taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24.
21. 556 F.2d at 16. The overbreadth arose because the order barred even nonoffensive

uses of the seven words. Id. at 17. Although Judge Tamm declined to attempt to construe the
term "indecent" in § 1464, id. at 15, he apparently assumed that nonoffensive language could
never be indecent.

The fatal vagueness in the order was its failure to define "children'." Id. at 17. Judge Tamm
did not discuss two uncertainties in the Commission's statement of the times during which the

words could not be broadcast. (I) When are there few enough children in the audience? See
notes 102 & 103 and text accompanying notes 100-03 infra. (2) At those times, is the standard

different? See note 15 supra. The order also did not make clear whether it banned only
repetitive use of the seven words. Compare 556 F.2d at 19 n.2 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) with
id. at 31-32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
22. 556 F.2d at 18-19 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 20-24.

25. Id. at 24-30.
26. Id. at 31-32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).

27. Id. at 32-33. See also text accompanying notes 74-79 infra.
28. 556 F.2d at 32-35.
29. Id. at 35.
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"obscene," the "indecent" and the "profane." 30 The few reported cases
interpreting "indecent" and "profane" provide little guidance on the meaning of those terms. Although the Supreme Court has made strenuous efforts
over the last two decades to define "obscene," 3 1 it has done so in the
context of printed material and motion pictures rather than radio and television broadcasts. The most recent major obscenity case is Miller, which held
that material is obscene if and only if it appeals to the prurient interest,
32
offensively depicts sexual conduct and lacks serious value.
The only reported case upholding a crimifial conviction for broadcasting profanity is Duncan v. United'States.33 In Duncan, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on state cases that viewed
profanity as abuse of religious terms, 34 held profane a radio broadcast that
"used the expression 'By God' irreverently." 35 Thirty-five years later, in
Gagliardo v. United States, 36 the same circuit found no profanity in a
'37
citizens' band radio broadcast that included the words "God damn it."
Duncan was cited but not distinguished with any clarity. 38 In Tailman v.
United States, 3 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
suggested in dictum that "profane" referred to personal epithets that might
provoke violence or are grossly offensive. 40 This definition might include
30. See note 14 supra.
31. For the history of the Court's struggle to define obscenity, see Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. See note 20 supra.
33. 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931).
34. Id. at 133. The definitions stated in these nonbroadcasting cases included "[a]ny
words importing an imprecation of divine vengeance or implying divine condemnation, so used
as to constitute a public nuisance," Gaines v. State, 75 Tenn. 410, 411 (1881), and "language
irreverent toward God or holy things," City of Georgetown v. Scurry, 90 S.C. 346, 349,73 S.E.
353, 354 (1912). The Duncan court did not specifically approve any particular definition.
35. 48 F.2d at 134. Defendant-appellant, owner of radio station KVEP in Portland,
Oregon, also "referred to an individual as 'damned,'. . . and. . . announced his intention to
call down the curse of God upon certain individuals." Id. Although this language was used in
the course of an attack on a local school board member, among others, the court did not discuss
whether the first amendment protected the speech.
36. 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966).
37. Id. at 725.
38. The court said, "Since the only words attributed to appellant which could even
remotely be considered as being 'profane' were 'God damn it,' which were . . . uttered in
anger, there is no basis for holding that the language was 'profane' within the meaning of the
statute." Id. This may mean that words uttered in anger are never profane. Another interpretation was accepted by the Alabama Court of Appeals in reviewing a conviction for disturbing the
peace by profane language. That court cited Duncan and Gagliardoand inferred from them
"that to constitute profanity an accused must imprecate divine vengeance upon an individual
and that while the expression 'God damn you' is considered profanity, 'God damn it' is not."
Baines v. City of Birmingham, 46 Ala. App. 267,271,240 So. 2d 689, 692, cert. denied, 286 Ala.
732, 240 So. 2d 694 (1970), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 403 U.S. 927, rev'd per
curiam on othergrounds, 47 Ala. App. 737, 253 So. 2d 58 (1971).
39. 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972).
40. Id. at 286. The comment was dictum because the court found that appellant had been
tried solely for using obscene language and that his language was indeed obscene. Id. at 287.
For this reason, the trial judge had not defined the terms "indecent" and "profane" and
,nnilnnt 'ndd not chnllenee the meanines of those terms. Id. at 286.
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some nonreligious epithets, 4 but exclude "God damn you" as being too
mild by today's standards to provoke violence or to be grossly offensive.
There is no authoritative interpretation of the term "indecent" as it is
used in section 1464.42 Both Duncan and Tallman appear to treat "indecent" as synonymous with "obscene." The Duncan court stated the test for
obscenity, discussed several cases applying this test to allegedly obscene
statements and concluded that appellant's language was neither obscene nor

indecent-with no independent analysis of indecency. 43 Nevertheless, Gagliardo expressly rejected this interpretation of Duncan.44 That court reversed a section 1464 conviction because of the trial judge's failure to define
"indecent" for the jury,45 but offered no guidance as to how it should be
defined after the remand. Petitioner in Tallman challenged the constitutionality of the ban on indecent speech. The court upheld section 146446 on the
authority of Roth v. United States,47 in which the Supreme Court held that
obscene material was not protected by the first amendment. 4 8 The reliance
41. But see Stewart v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976) (shout of "m-f-"
at policeman in the District of Columbia is neither provocative of violence nor grossly offen.
sive).
42. See 556 F.2d at 15; 56 F.C.C.2d at 97.
43. 48 F.2d at 132-33.
44. 366 F.2d at 725 n.7.
45. Id. at 725.
46. 465 F.2d at 285.
47. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
48. The statutes upheld by the Court in Roth (and in its companion case, Alberts v.
California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)) resembled § 1464 in that they were not confined to "obscene"
material. One was a federal statute that prohibited the mailing of "[e]very obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1461, 62 Stat. 683 (formerly codified
as 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952)) (amended 1955). The other, a California law, made it a misdemeanor
to keep for sale "any obscene or indecent . . . book." Law of April 17, 1952, ch. 23, § 4(3),
1953 Cal. Stats., 1952 1st Extraordinary Sess. 380 (formerly codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 311
(West 1955)) (amended 1969). Nevertheless, the opinions considered only the constitutional
status of obscene material. In Roth, the trial judge's instructions to the jury gave the words
'obscene," "lewd" and "lascivious" a single meaning, one that the Court approved. 354 U.S.
at 486. The trial judge's definition of "filthy," however, distinguished that term from "obscene," saying that obscene material promoted impure thoughts while filthy material aroused
revulsion. 237 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1956). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had rejected defendant's challenge to this definition of "filthy" because that court
thought the definition correct and because defendant had not raised the issue at trial. Id. at 799800. The definition is apparently inconsistent with the Supreme Court's insistence on appeal to
the prurient interest. See 354 U.S. at 487-88. In rejecting the vagueness challenge to the terms in
the statute, the Court said, "These words, appliedaccording to the properstandardforjudging
obscenity, . . . give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed.
...
Id. at 491 (emphasis
added). Presumably, either Roth did not press the contention that he might have been unconstitutionally convicted for mailing a filthy but nonobscene book, or the Supreme Court agreed
with the Second Circuit that he had waived this objection.
The California state courts' interpretations of the state law challenged in Alberts had not
distinguished between "obscene" and "indecent" material. See People v. Alberts, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 909, 911, 292 P.2d 90, 91 (1955). The California definition of the phrase "obscene or
indecent" met the United States Supreme Court's requirements for the definition of "obscene." 354 U.S. at 486. Thus neither Roth nor Alberts required the Court to consider the
constitutionality of censoring nonobscene material.
The Court has indicated its willingness to construe federal statutes using "indecent" (or
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on Roth suggests that the Tallman court considered the obscene to be the
same as the indecent, but the decision was on the ground of obscenity.4 9
The Federal Communications Act empowers the FCC to assess forfeitures against licensees who violate section 1464.50 In the absence of a
judicial definition of "indecent," the FCC has developed its own interpretation. The leading case is WUHY-FM. 5' The Commission assessed a forfeiture against a Philadelphia radio station, WUHY-FM, because it had broadcast a prerecorded interview in which the words "shit" and "fucking" were
apparently used frequently. 52 While conceding that the broadcast was not
obscene, 53 the FCC held it to be indecent.54 The opinion defined the term
"indecent" to mean that "the material broadcast is (a) patently offensive by
contemporary community standards; and (b) is utterly without redeemiig
social value." 55 This standard simply restated the then-prevailing definition
of obscenity, as announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,56 minus the first
element of that definition: appeal to the prurient interest. The Commission
found this broadcast patently offensive, although neither the FCC nor the
similar words) as encompassing only the obscene, should such construction be necessary to
avoid constitutional problems. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8Mm. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973). This limiting construction was actually applied to an amended version
of the unmailable-matter statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 114 (1974), to avoid vagueness problems. Judge Bazelon has interpreted Hamling as
requiring a similar construction of § 1464 "by necessary implication." Illinois Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397,418 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., stating why he
voted to grant rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court has never heard a case arising under §
1464. When it does, § 1464 could be distinguished from § 1461 on the ground that the FCC, by
taking care to set out its interpretation of "indecent," see text accompanying note 55 infra, has
sufficiently clarified that term to save § 1464 from unconstitutional vagueness. Of course, it
could still be unconstitutional for overbreadth, see text accompanying notes 69-139 infra, and
any particular order issued under it could be unconstitutionally vague.
49. See note 40 supra.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(E) (1970).
51. 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). This case is occasionally cited as Eastern Education(al)
Radio.
52. The broadcast was the January 4, 1970, edition of a weekly program, "Cycle II,"
described by the station as "concerned with the avant-garde movement in music, publications,
art, film, personalities, and other forms of social and artistic experimentation." The program
was designed to reach college students and other "alienated" young people. Letter from
WUHY-FM to FCC (Feb. 12, 1970), quoted in 24 F.C.C.2d at 408 n.l. It aired at 10 p.m.
Sunday. 24 F.C.C.2d at 408. The FCC objected to such usages as "S-t man" and "Political
change is so fg slow." Id. at 409. See also id. at 416-17 (excerpts from interview
transcript).
53. 24 F.C.C.2d at 412.
54. Id. at 414.
55. Id. at 412.
56. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen.,
383 U.S. 413 (1966). This case is frequently cited simply as Memoirs v. Massachusetts. The
Memoirs standard was that
three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is
patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly
without redeeming social value.
Id. at 418.
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station had received any complaints about it from listeners. 5 7 It also found
the broadcast to be without redeeming social value, although the dissenters
argued that such language was important as a reflection of the culture and
58
life style of disaffected young people.
The WUHY opinion paid little attention to possible first amendment
problems, because of what the FCC called the "vital consideration ' 59 that

judicial review was available to protect freedom of speech. No such review
was sought in WUHY. The FCC's definition of "indecent" has been
challenged in only one reported case.' On that occasion the United States
Court of Appeals for the listrict of Columbia upheld the assessment of a
forfeiture because it found the broadcast in question obscene, and thus did
6
not reach the issue of indecency. '
Judge Tamm's opinion in Pacifica also did not reach this issue.
Dispositive of the case for Judge Tamm was the statutory prohibition against
censorship in section 326.62 He considered and rejected the FCC's argument
that its order merely "channeled" speech. 63 Holding that the order censored
speech, he concluded that it violated section 326 and was therefore invalid,
whatever the constitutional status of the speech sought to be suppressed.64
57. 24 F.C.C.2d at 409 n.2. The FCC apparently made no effort to determine the community's reaction to such language. Id. at 423 (Johnson, Comm'r, preliminarily dissenting).
58. Commissioner Johnson quoted Professor Ashley Montagu's belief that swearing has
social value. Id. at 424 (Johnson, Comm'r, preliminarily dissenting). Commissioner Cox
thought young people used such language partly because "it is intended to show disrespect for
the standards of their elders, which they regard as outmoded, without real basis, and 'irrelevant.'" Id. at 419 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also accepted the
station's contention that " '[tlhe challenged language . . reflected the personality and life
style of' " the interviewee, Jerry Garcia, the leader of the rock band "The Grateful Dead." Id.
(quoting letter from WUHY-FM to FCC, supra note 52). Some of Commissioner Cox's
arguments show a concern, not that the language per se had social value, but that the necessity
of keeping it off the air would impair the social value of the rest of the program. "It might have
been difficult for Mr. Garcia to change his habits of speech without interfering with the flow of
his ideas-or he might simply have refused to give the interview at all on those terms." Id.at
419. Deleting offensive words would be such an inconvenience to the station that it might well
choose not to interview such people at all. Id. at 420-21.
59. Id. at 415.
60. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RADIo REG. 2d (P & F) 285, reconsiderationdenied,
41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Apparent Liability of Station WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919
(1973) (texts of FCC news release on, and Comm'r Johnson's dissent in, Sonderling).
61. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 403 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The Commission had applied the WUHY definition of indecency to an explicit discussion of oral sex. "Femme Forum," a live call-in program, was broadcast every weekday from
10 a.m. to 3 p.m. on WGLD-FM, Oak Park, Illinois. Id. at 401. On February 23, 1973, the
subject discussed was oral sex. Women in the audience called the station and described their
own oral sex experiences in explicit terms. Id. The FCC held that the broadcast was obscene
under the Memoirs test, id. at 403-04, and added, as an alternative ground for the decision, that
the broadcast was also indecent under the WUHY test, id. at 403 n. 14. There is no indication in
the FCC or court of appeals opinions that any of the words later proscribed in Pacifica were
used. The alleged indecency arose strictly from the subject matter and what was said about it.
62. 556 F.2d at 15.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 15.

1978]

FCC REGULATION

This position, however, gives no effect to section 1464 or to the FCC's
power to enforce that section. 65 The language of section 1464 was originally
enacted as the second sentence of section 326 of the Communications Act of
1934.66 Because Congress, when it banned censorship, simultaneously
banned the broadcast of certain speech and later gave the FCC the power to
enforce the latter ban, 67 the categories of speech so proscribed must be
considered exceptions to the statutory rule that the FCC may not engage in
68
censorship.
The major issue raised by Pacifica is the extent to which the first
amendment prohibits the FCC from censoring offensive speech. The
Commission could, as it did in Sonderling BroadcastingCorp. ,69 defend
the constitutionality of a given restriction in two ways. First, it could argue
that the particular broadcast in question was not protected speech because it
fell within one of the currently recognized exceptions to the first amendment's coverage, such as obscene speech 70 or "fighting" words. 7' Second,
the Commission could argue that the courts should withhold constitutional
protection from a newly recognized category of unprotected speech, the
indecent, which might be limited to broadcast speech. 72
The FCC apparently did not consider the first argument applicable to
73
the facts of Pacifica, as it did not consider the Carlin monologue obscene.
Judge Leventhal, however, thought that the monologue could be included
within Miller's expanded definition of obscenity. 74 The Miller Court included in its opinion an example of a standard a state legislature might
constitutionally adopt: "Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of . . . excretory functions." ' 75 The Court offered this as an acceptable
standard for defining "patently offensive," the second of the three elements
65. See note 14 supra.
(1970); 47 id. §
66. Ch. 652, § 326, 48 Stat. 1064 (presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1,164

326). This sentence was shifted to Title 18 in 1948 as part of the revision of the United States
Criminal Code. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1464, 62 Stat. 683 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1464

(1970)).
67. Communications Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, § 7a, 74 Stat. 889
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970)).

68. Chief Judge Bazelon thought it unclear how much power the FCC had under 47 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)(E) (1970); see note I supra. 556 F.2d at 20 n.7 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Although
he cited that section and § 1464, he rejected Judge Tamm's argument for a different reason. He

thought that Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
limited § 326 so that it provided no greater protection of offensive speech than did the first

amendment. See 556 F.2d at 20 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
69. 27 RADIO REG. 2d (P & F) 285, reconsiderationdenied, 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd

sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
70. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 485.
71. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
72. See 556 F.2d at 24 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). These two alternatives are not exclusive.
73. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94-95.

74. 556 F.2d at 32-33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
75. 413 U.S. at 25.
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of obscenity.7 6 Judge Leventhal, however, interpreted it as an acceptable
standard for defining "obscene" and thought that Miller therefore authorized the expansion of the concept of obscenity to include material not
appealing to the prurient interest. 77 Judge Bazelon disagreed, reading Miller
as requiring appeal to the prurient interest whether or not there was offensive
representation of excretory functions. 78 Judge Leventhal's interpretation, if
accepted, would have major consequences for FCC regulation of offensive
speech: regulation would be constitutional even without a finding of appeal
to the prurient interest and, presumably, even without a finding of lack of
79
serious value.
The FCC's opinion in Pacifica abandoned the obscenity argument. It
rested on a finding of fact that the Carlin monologue was indecent8 ° and on
the legal theory, first applied in WUHY, that nonobscene but indecent
broadcasts could constitutionally be banned. 8 1 The Commission departed
from the WUHY definition of indecency, however, by changing its second
element-that "the material broadcast . . . [be] utterly without redeeming
social value. "82 Some revision was clearly justified in light of Miller. The
obvious change would have been to require, as the second element, that the
material broadcast lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. 83 Instead, the Commission went much further and greatly weakened,
76. After setting out the three-part standard, see note 20 supra, the Court said, "It is
possible . . . to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation
under part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion, supra: . . . (b) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals." 413 U.S. at 25.
77. The pre-Millerrulings had always defined "obscene" in terms of what appeals to
the lewd and prurient interest . . . . But Miller expanded on this-to include "patently offensive representations or descriptions of . . . excretory functions."
This is in substance a stretch of the prohibition to go beyond the lewd obscene to the
excretory indecent.
556 F.2d at 32-33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 21 n.II (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
79. Judge Leventhal limited his argument in Pacifica to the contention that appeal to the
prurient interest is not a necessary element of obscenity. See note 77 supra. He did not say
whether lack of serious value remains an element. Nevertheless, his logic seems to imply that it
does not. Assuming that "offensive representations or descriptions of excretory functions" is
an example merely of patent offensiveness, the second Miller element, see note 20 supra, such
representations do not necessarily satisfy the requirement that the material appeal to the
prurient interest, the first element, see id. Miller made clear that the conjunction of all three
elements is necessary to a finding of obscenity. Therefore, Judge Leventhal's argument is
sound only if "offensive representations or descriptions of excretory functions" is an example
of obscenity. In that case there need be no additional proof either of appeal to the prurient
interest or of lack of serious value.
80. 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
81. Id. at 97-98.
82. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412; see text accompanying note 55 supra.
83. See note 20 supra. The second element of the WUHY definition of indecency was
modeled on the third element of the Memoirs definition of obscenity. See text accompanying
note 56 supra. Since Miller changed the latter, 413 U.S. at 24-25, it would have been appropriate for the FCC to change the former to maintain the parallelism.
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perhaps eliminated, 84 the requirement that the banned broadcast be valueless. It held that "when children may be in the audience, [indecent
language] cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. "85 The FCC argued 86 that this approach did not
violate the first amendment because of the Supreme Court's holding in
Ginsberg v. New York. 87 In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the conviction of a
newsdealer who had sold two "girlie" magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy.
The magazines would not have been considered obscene for adults. The
statute under which the newsdealer had been convicted prohibited the sale to
minors of material meeting the statutory definition of "harmful to
88
minors."
The FCC did not discuss two important differences between the holding in Ginsberg and its own Pacifica rule. The first is that Ginsberg still
requires a finding that the challenged material be obscene as to children.
Ginsberg was decided in 1968, when the prevailing standard of obscenity
was that set forth in Memoirs.89 The New York statute upheld by the
Ginsberg Court simply added the words "of minors" or "for minors" to
each of the three parts of the Memoirs definition of obscenity. 90 In particular, the statutory proscription applied only to material that was "utterly
without redeeming social importance for minors.'"91 Although the Supreme
Court has not yet had occasion to consider the impact of Miller on the
84. The "definition of 'indecent' language in WUHY.

.

. is clarified by eliminating the

test 'utterly without redeeming social value' which the Supreme Court modified in Miller
...
" FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, supra -note 3, at 425 (discussing Pacifica)
(emphasis added).

85. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (footnote omitted). The WUHY definition of "indecent," omitting
appeal to the prurient interest as an element, has never been passed on by a court. See text
accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra. The FCC's Pacifica rule goes beyond WUHYby disallow-

ing the defense of redeeming social value. But see note 15 supra.
86. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 n.6.
87. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

88. See note 90 infra.
89. See note 56 supra.
90. The statute read:
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic

abuse, when it:

(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors;

and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and

(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1066 (formerly codified as N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 484-h(1)(f) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1966)) (repealed 1967) (current version at N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
"Harmful to minors," so defined, was made an element in a finding that the sale of the
material to minors was prohibited. Law of June 14, 1965, ch. 372, § 1, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1135
(formerly codified as N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 484-i (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1966)) (repealed 1967)
(current version at N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 235.21 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
91. Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, sec. 1, § 484-h(l)(f)(iii), 1965 N.Y. Laws 1066 (repealed
1967), quoted in note 90 supra.
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definition of obscenity for children, 9 2 it isnot difficult to envision the new
test. It would stand in the same relationship to the Miller test as the
Ginsberg test did to that of Memoirs, and thus would require that the
material lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for children. 93 Ginsberg, therefore, does not support the FCC's refusal to consider
the possible redeeming value of an offensive broadcast.
The second major problem with the FCC's reliance on Ginsberg is that
broadcasting reaches adults as well as children. In Butler v. Michigan,9 the
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a defendant who had sold books
not suitable for minors. The actual purchaser was an adult (a plainclothes
policeman), but the statute barred the sale of such materials to anyone. 95 The
state's contention that the materials were unsuitable for minors was not
disputed. Nevertheless, the Court found the statute unconstitutional because
it "reduce[d] the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for
children." 96 The Ginsberg Court was careful to distinguish Butler by
pointing out that the New York statute barred only sales to minors. 97 With
regard to material that is not obscene for adults but is obscene for children,
'therefore, the first amendment allows a ban on distribution to children
(Ginsberg) but prohibits a ban on distribution to adults (Butler). This
doctrine is easily applied to printed materials. Because each copy of a book
or magazine is sold to one purchaser, print media allow for what could be
called the discrete distribution of obscene material.98 Broadcasting, on the
other hand, reaches many people simultaneously. A court reviewing a
restriction on the broadcasting of Ginsberg-typematerial must accept one of
two unattractive alternatives: either the first amendment protects the distribution to children of material that is obscene for them or it does not protect
the distribution to adults of material that is not obscene for them. The same
92. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 42 2 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975).

93. The other two elements would be (a)whether the average person, applying contempo.
rary community standards, would find that the w9 fk, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest of minors, and (b) whether the Work depicts or describes in a way patently offensive to
minors sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. See note 20 supra; cf.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) (similar wording in 1974
amendment to New York law).
94. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
95. The statute read in part, "Any person who shall . . . sell . . . any book . . .

containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language . ..tending to incite minors to
violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth, . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Law of May 15, 1953, Pub. Act No. 74, 1953
Mich. Pub. Acts 71 (formerly codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.343 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
28.575 (Callaghan 1954))) (repealed 1957).
96. 352 U.S. at 383.

97. 390 U.S. at 6344,5.
98. Cf. Classroom lecture by Professor Harry Kalven, University of Chicago Law School
(Apr. 15, 1974) (class notes of James Beckwith, Assistant Professor of Law, North Carolina
Central University) (copy on file in office of North CarolinaLaw Review). Professor Beckwith
believes Professor Kalven used the word "discreet"--i.e., circumspect or prudent-as opposed to "discrete"-i.e., individually distinct.
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problem arises whenever the content of a broadcast is regulable with respect
99
to only a part of the broadcast audience.
The unattractiveness of the second alternative is diminished, the FCC
argued in Pacifica, by the nature of the order's restriction on offensive
words. Such language was not totally excluded from the airwaves; rather, it
was "channeled"00 into those time periods when fewer children would be
exposed to it. WUHY was based in part on protecting children from
exposure to offensive language aired between 10 and 11 p.m., 1° t so the
restricted language might well be banned until 11 p.m. or even later. 0 2 By
prohibiting such broadcasts during most of the day, the FCC's order im03
posed a substantial burden on constitutionally protected speech.
Because of these two differences between Ginsberg and Pacifica, the
FCC's censorship of offensive broadcasts would represent a significant
extension of Ginsberg, one not justified by the Ginsberg Court's reasoning.
The first reason the Ginsberg Court gave for affirming the conviction was
that parents have a traditional right to control their children's upbringing. 104
Some parents would not want their children to read pornography, and the
New York statute helped them enforce that desire. 105 The Court took care to
point out that other parents were free to buy the magazines themselves and
give them to their children. 106 Restrictions on the content of broadcasts,
however, leave no room for parental choice. The Court's other basis for
99. The basis for regulating the Carlin monologue would be indecency rather than obscenity. The FCC opinion leaves open the possibility that the monologue would be regulable even

with respect to adults. See 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. If it were, the problem of indiscreteness would be
avoided entirely. The problem would also be avoided if the mon6logue, because of its serious

value, were held to be nonregulable even with respect to children. See text accompanying notes
89-93 supra.
100. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission analogized the regulation of offensive broadcasts

to nuisance law: "The law of nuisance does not say.

. . that

no one shall maintain a pigsty; it

simply says that no one shall maintain a pigsty in an inappropriate place.
101. See note 52 supra.

... Id.

102. The Commission's Pacifica opinion referred variously to "times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience," 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (footnote

omitted); times "[wihen the number of children in the audience is reduced to a minimum, for
example during the late evening hours," id.; and simply "the late evening hours," id. at 100.
103. Judge Tamm cited studies showing "that large numbers of children are in the broadcast audience until 1:30 a.m." 556 F.2d at 13-14. As Judge Bazelon noted, the effect of the
order was to make the material unavailable to adults with normal sleeping habits. Id. at 19-20,
27 (Bazelon, C.S., concurring). The severity of this burden on the speech distinguishes Pacifica
from Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In that case the Supreme
Court upheld a restriction on the location of "adult" movie theaters. The challenged ordinance
burdened speech only slightly because the theaters retained adequate opportunities to enter the
market. Id. at 62.

104. 390 U.S. at 639.
105. Id. The Court distinguished between imposing morality on the child and supporting
the parent's right to'decide what the child would see. Id. at 639 n.7 (quoting Henkin, Morals

and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 413 n. 68 (1963)).
106. Id. at 639.
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affirming the conviction in Ginsberg-thestate's independent interest in the
welfare of childrent 7-may well be inapplicable to cases involving offensive but nonobscene speech. This state interest was held to justify the
prohibition because the legislature could rationally find pornography to be
harmful to children. 108 The evidence cited in Ginsberg, however, concerned
only the effects of material that appealed to the prurient interest; it is not
clear that the FCC could rationally find any danger in material that lacked
this element of obscenity.' t 9 Furthermore, the magazines in Ginsberg
concededly had no redeeming social importance for minors. 110 Ginsberg
does not hold that it is rational to find material harmful to minors while
ignoring any value that it has for them.
The preceding discussion has distinguished Ginsberg from Pacifica on
the assumption that print media distribute obscene material discretely. An
adult purchaser of a book or magazine, however, may reconvey it to a child.
The Supreme Court has taken note of this " 'outside business' in these
materials" 111 and has drawn the conclusion that they cannot be kept out of
the hands of children once they are sold. This suggests an inconsistency
between Ginsberg and Butler: the state interests that supported the law
upheld in Ginsberg1 2 would also be served by the law struck down in
Butler.
There are two theories on which these cases might be reconciled. The
first is that an adult's interest in receiving the material always outweighs the
state's interest in keeping it from children."t 3 Censorship of speech that is
not obscene for adults is constitutional only if no adult's rights are affected.
This interpretation would limit permissible censorship of such speech to
cases in which a minor was the only recipient of the material. Censorship of
107. Id. at 640.
108. Id. at 639, 641.
109. Regulation of obscene material is frequently defended on the ground that consumers
of such material may be moved by it to commit antisocial sexual acts. See, e.g., Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1973). This danger would presumably be absent if the
material were completely nonsexual.
110. See 390 U.S. at 635.

I 1.

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.7 (1973). See also United States v. 12

200-Ft. Reels of Super 8Mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115,

120 (1973). All three of these cases involved materials that were obscene for both adults and
children.
112. See text accompanying notes 104-08 supra.
113. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1,7, for a

similar interpretation of Butler. There might be an exception to this principle when children are
both the intended and the primary audience of the broadcast. In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966), the Court allowed a jury to determine the obscenity vel non of the material with
reference to a special group (homosexuals) rather than to the general population, when the

material was "designed for and primarily disseminated to" that group. Id. at 508. Judge
Leventhal, by contrast, would consider the presence of children in the audience if the broadcast
were "geared to children-or [if] . . .a substantialnumber of children are likely to be in the
audience without parental supervision." 556 F.2d at 36 (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
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nonobscene broadcasting, therefore, would never be allowed. The other
reading of Butler and Ginsberg is that, although a state may protect
children, it may do so only by acting against the person who directly
conveys unsuitable material to a child. Earlier links in the chain of distribution may not be made unlawful, because no children are affected by them.
This interpretation would allow censorship of broadcasting because the
broadcaster himself takes the last step and reaches children directly.
The language used in the Butler and Ginsberg opinions suggests that
the Court was acting on the first of these two theories. Had the Butler Court
been following the second theory, it would have justified the reversal of the
conviction on the ground that the law did not serve the state interest (because
defendant bookseller was not the person who had directly conveyed any
material to children). Instead, it reasoned that the Michigan law was not the
least restrictive means of achieving the state's goal because it infringed on
the first amendment rights of adults. 114 Similarly, the Ginsberg Court could
have distinguished Butler on the ground that the defendant newsdealer in
Ginsberg had himself sold pornography to a minor. In fact, however, the
Court distinguished the statute on the ground that the New York law
challenged in Ginsberg did not prohibit sales to adults. 115 In Pacifica, Judge
Tamm"1 6 and Chief Judge Bazelon 17 appeared to follow the Supreme Court
in adopting the first theory, while the FCC 18 and Judge Leventhal' 9 acted
on the second.
In addition to its expressed desire to protect children from offensive
language, the FCC has argued, in Pacifica120 and other cases, 121 that
broadcasting is properly subject to stricter regulation because of its intrusive
nature. A broadcast can reach unconsenting adults who did not know what
they would hear when they tuned in to the program. Because this intrusion
occurs in the home, the privacy interest involved is especially important. A
case frequently cited by the FCC to support media content regulation is
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department.1 22 The Supreme Court in
Rowan held it constitutionally permissible for the Post Office to honor
postal patrons' requests that they not receive mail containing sexually
explicit advertising.1 23 The Court gave as one of its reasons the importance
114.
115.
116.
117.

See text accompanying note 96 supra.
390 U.S. at 634-35.
See 556 F.2d at 17.
See id. at 27-28 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).

118. See 56 F.C.C.2d at 97.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See 556 F.2d at 36 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
56 F.C.C.2d at 98-99.
See, e.g., WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411.
397 U.S. 728 (1970).
The Post Office does so under 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1970).
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of protecting the individual's right to be free of unwelcome intrusions in the
24
home. 1
Rowan does provide some support for the FCC's position with respect
to broadcast media. The intrusion on privacy was only fleeting, as the
recipient could discard the offensive mail upon realizing its nature;
nevertheless, the interest in not receiving it at all was held sufficient to
justify the statute. This interest is similar to the interest of a dial-scanner in
not hearing a single vulgar word. The major difficulty in applying Rowan to
broadcasting is the distinction between the discrete and the indiscrete distribution of obscene or other offensive material. The mail is a discrete
medium, so the enforcement of the statute on behalf of those postal patrons
offended by the advertisements posed no threat to others' first amendment
interests in being able to receive such material.
The Supreme Court has considered the problem of invasion of privacy
through indiscrete media in two important cases. Appellant in Cohen v.
California'2 5 had entered the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a
jacket inscribed "Fuck the Draft." His conviction on a charge of disturbing
the peace was reversed. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville126 the owner of
a drive-in movie theater had been forbidden to show movies including any
nudity, even if the movies were not obscene, because the screen was visible
from the public highway. This municipal ordinance was held unconstitutional. 127 In each case the Court held that the appellant's activities were protected by the first amendment, although recognizing that there was a danger that
the "speech" might reach the eyes of people who would find such expression offensive. 128 Balancing these interests, the Court held the former to be
greater, especially since the offended, onlookers could protect their privacy
by averting their eyes. 129 By analogy, an offended recipient of a radio or
television program can "avert his ears" by turning the dial.
Judge Leventhal rejected this analogy on the ground that, in both
Cohen and Erznoznik, no one was offended except in a public place. 130 He
accepted the FCC's argument that broadcasts of indecent language reach
124. 397 U.S. at 736-37.
125. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
126. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
127. Id. at 217. In addition, the city was barred from ordering the owner to build fences to
block the view. See id. at 211 n.8.
128. See 422 U.S. at 212; 403 U.S. at 22.

129. The Court in Cohen held that the state could prevent intrusions only when "substantial privacy interests [were] being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." 403 U.S. at 21.
Because offended onlookers could be free of the intrusion simply by averting their eyes, Cohen
was not such a case. Id. Nor was Erznoznik, for the same reason. 422 U.S. at 211-12.
130. 556 F.2d at 33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). Cohen specifically acknowledged the

greater privacy interest in being free from unwanted expression in the home. 403 U.S. at 21-22.
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people in their homes, where their interest in privacy is entitled to greater
protection. It is true that, while in their homes, people usually expect to be
relatively unaffected by events in the outside world, but a broadcast interferes with no one who does not take affirmative steps to receive it. When
someone in a house does turn on a radio or television set, he does so for the
precise purpose of being affected by the outside world. It seems most
reasonable to say that to turn on a radio or television set is to enter a public
"place," no matter where the set happens to be located. 131 Modern technology makes it possible to leave one's home without leaving the house.
Under this analysis, broadcasting is not similar to the sound truck
blaring in the street. 13 2 A better analogy would be to a person living across
the street from the Los Angeles County Courthouse, who complained that,
by standing on a chair and looking through a window with a pair of
binoculars, he could see through the courthouse window and read the
lettering on Cohen's jacket. His argument that the privacy of his home had
been invaded would not be accepted, even though the offensive speech did
enter his home. The very purpose of his action was to overcome the barrier
placed between him and the world by the walls of his house. Having thus
voluntarily exposed himself to a public place, he must take the consequences.
Given that the airwaves constitute a public "place" in some sense of
that term, it is for the government to decide what sort of place it should be.
Under some circumstances a municipality may, to preserve the peaceful
character of a public park, ban all speeches and rallies in it. 133 This kind of
131. See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 17; id. at 26-27 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Note, Filthy
Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV.

579, 618 (1975). The FCC has drawn a distinction between the continuing affirmative steps
required by one reading a book (the reader must continue reading and turning pages) and the
single affirmative step required by broadcast media (the listener may turn a radio or television

set on and then do nothing more). See, e.g., 556 F.2d at 33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting); WUHYFM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411. It is not clear why the Commission considers this distinction to be of

any importance. Even the listener has taken an affirmative step. Conceivably the FCC is
concerned with protecting the right of an individual to give his consent to the intrusion and then
withdraw that consent without having to turn the set off. Cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,
1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) (broadcast messages may have
greater impact than written ones because an habitual watcher must take affirmative action to

avoid them).
132. Those offended by sound trucks in residential areas could not avert their ears. See
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21.
133. See generally Note, The Public Forum:Minimum Access, EqualAccess, and the First
Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975) and sources cited therein.
In addition to arguing that broadcasting is intrusive, the FCC has sought to distinguish it
from other media by citing the scarcity of spectrum space. See, e.g., Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at

97. The Supreme Court has relied on this factor in holding that broadcast speech is entitled to
less first amendment protection than is printed speech. CompareRed Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (not unconstitutional to require broadcasters to provide equal time to
opposing views), with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (similar law
applied to newspapers is unconstitutional). Scarcity poses the danger that important points of
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censorship promotes the public use of the park. The FCC has made an
analogous argument for its regulation of offensive broadcasts, arguing that,
if indecent language became widespread,
it would drastically affect the use of radio by millions of people. No
one could ever know, in home or car listening, when he or his
children would encounter what he would regard as the most vile
expressions serving no purpose but to shock, to pander to sensationalism. Very substantial numbers would either curtail using
radio or would restrict their use to but a few channels or frequencies, abandoning the present
practice of turning the dial to find
134
some appealing program.
As an empirical prediction, this seems dubious. The FCC received no
complaints about the interview in the WUHY case, 135 the broadcast of
which raised this specter in the Commission's deliberations. The Carlin
monologue in Pacifica drew one complaint. 136 In neither WUHY nor
Pacifica did the Commission provide any evidence to substantiate its
37
fears. 1
Even if the FCC is correct on this point, it has established only that
society would be better off if the public "place" of the airwaves were
regulated to remove this danger, not that such regulation would be constitutional. The Court in Cohen said that the strongest argument for upholding
the conviction was "that the States, acting as guardians of public morality,
38
may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary." 1
This is a policy consideration similar to the FCC's asserted role as guardian
view will not be aired. For this reason, Commissioner Johnson has adhered to a distinction
between affirmative obligations (e.g., Red Lion) and negative prohibitions, arguing that only

the former serve to increase the diversity of programming. See Apparent Liability of Station
WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919, 921-22 (1973) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting in Sonderling). The

Court in Red Lion agreed that prohibitions were harder to justify. See 395 U.S. at 396. See also
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
134. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411.
135. Id. at 409 n.2.
136. 556 F.2d at 11.See also Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 780 n.10
(1973) (Commission denies reconsideration of its earlier decision, 27 RADIO REC. 2d (P & F) 285

(1973), discounting claim of public opposition to censorship because it has received "only" four
complaints about the earlier decision).

137. Even without FCC censorship, economic factors would severely limit offensive
broadcasts. See 556 F.2d at 18; WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 421 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Note, supra note 131, at 615. The Supreme Court has upheld an

ordinance requiring the dispersal of "adult" movie theaters, but only after determining that
there was a factual basis for the city's justification for controlling them. Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
The Court in American Mini Theatres also distinguished that case from Erznoznilk. In
Erznoznik Jacksonville's goal was to prevent the dissemination of offensive speech, while in
American Mini Theatres Detroit sought to prevent the "secondary effect[s]" of clusters of
"adult" theaters. Id. at 71 n.34. The FCC could argue that public abandonment of dial-scanning
is such a secondary effect, but the effect is linked to the offensiveness of the speech to some

citizens. American Mini Theatres included in its list of secondary effects the attraction of
undesirables to the area and an increase in the crime rate. See id. at 55.
138. 403 U.S. at 22-23.
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of the public airwaves. Nevertheless, the Court in Cohen rejected this
justification for censorship. Freedom of speech, it said, also includes offensive speech, and putting up with the latter is the price that must be paid for
the former. 139
The Court in Miller reaffirmed the holding in Roth that the first
amendment does not protect obscene speech-a position that has been
vigorously disputed on both sides." 4° Nevertheless, the Burger Court has
shown no willingness to create another category of unprotected speech.
Rowan demonstrated the Court's concern for the unconsenting adult, but the
Court has elswhere noted that " '[t]he radio can be turned off. ....,"141
Erznoznik demonstrated that the goal of protecting children from offensive
material will not be allowed to override the first amendment interests of
adults. On the basis of these precedents, it seems unlikely that the FCC will
be successful in its attempts to sanitize the language used in some of our
most important public fora-the broadcast media.
JAMES M. LANE

Federal Jurisdiction-Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.:
The Interface of the Clayton Act and the Anti-Injunction Act
In Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.,I the United States Supreme Court
had, and failed to take advantage of, the opportunity to define more clearly
the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,2 which
prohibits the enjoining of state court proceedings. Specifically, the Court
had before it the issue whether section 16 of the Clayton Act,3 which
139. Id. at 24-26.
140. See generally Symposium, Obscenity and the Law, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275 (1977).
141. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting Packer Corp. v.
Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
1. 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
2. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
3. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (West Cum. Supp. 1977), provides in pertinent
part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including
sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and
principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon
the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted
and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue . . ..
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provides private injunctive relief in federal courts against Sherman Antitrust
Act 4 violations, qualifies as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. In its
attempt to construe section 2283, the Court became so embroiled in the
language of the statute and the case law interpreting it that it all but ignored
the policy behind the Act-'"to prevent needless friction between state and
federal courts." 5 The ultimate determination of the issue in Vendo may
reflect this policy, but the focus of the opinions raises the question whether
section 2283 has become so mechanically applied that it has lost its effectiveness.
The case came before the federal courts 6 when Lektro-Vend, Harry B.
Stoner and Stoner Investments brought an antitrust action against Vendo. As
part of that action, plaintiffs prayed that Vendo be temporarily enjoined
from collecting a seven million dollar judgment granted it by the Illinois
Supreme Court.7 Vendo had obtained the Illinois judgment in a suit brought
against Stoner for breach of a covenant against competition in his employment contract. 8 It was this restrictive covenant, along with the state court
action to enforce it, that formed the basis of the alleged antitrust violation in
Stoner's federal action. 9 The district court granted the injunction, finding
"evidence that Vendo had used litigation as a method of harassing and
eliminating competition."'" The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed." Both courts held that section 16 of the Clayton
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939).
6. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. III. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d

1050 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
7. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 III. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 975

(1975).
8. Vendo purchased Stoner Manufacturing Company from Harry B. Stoner and gave him
a five year employment contract that included a ten year, world-wide restrictive covenant
against competition. While employed by Vendo, Stoner, as an individual and through his
company Stoner Investments, invested in the embryonic Lektro-Vend Corporation. Stoner's
financial support and public backing of Lektro-Vend formed the basis of Vendo's state court
action against Stoner. 403 F. Supp. at 530-31.
9. A peripheral aspect of the Vendo litigation was the question whether the federal

antitrust laws can be asserted as an affirmative defense in the state courts. Lektro-Vend and
Stoner tried to assert such a defense at the trial level in the Illinois courts; this defense was
ordered stricken. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 545 F.2d at 1054 n.4. Although this ruling
was reversed on appeal, Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 III. App. 2d 261, 245 N.E.2d 263 (1969),

Lektro-Vend and Stoner withdrew the defense in the second round of the state court litigation.
545 F.2d at 1054 n.4.

The jurisdiction of state courts to hear federal antitrust defenses has been a matter of some
dispute. See Recent Cases, State Court Denies Jurisdictionin ContractAction to HearDefense
of Illegality Based on FederalAntitrust Laws, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1135 (1961). Justice Stevens, in
his dissenting opinion and without any dispute from the majority, appears to have assumed that

the state court did, indeed, have such authority. See 97 S. Ct. at 2904 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although this attitude on the part of the Court would appear to open up the state courts for

the assertion of federal antitrust defenses, it may be of limited utility. State courts cannot
accord full relief under the antitrust laws, id., a fact that will probably encourage persons so
aggrieved to continue to seek their remedies in the federal courts.
10. 403 F. Supp. at 534.
11. 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Act was an "expressly authorized" exception to section 2283, when, as
here, the state court action is itself part of the anticompetitive scheme. 12 The
district court further held that the injunction was "necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction," and therefore permissible under section 2283.13
The Supreme Court, in a splintered decision, reversed. 4 Justice Rehn15
quist, writing the opinion of the Court in which two other justices joined,
held that section 16 is not an "expressly authorized" exception to section
16
2283, and that the district court did not act "in aid of its jurisdiction."'
Justice Stevens wrote for the four dissenters 17 who found section 16 injunctions to be expressly authorized exceptions to section 2283.18 Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger conceded that section 16 can be an expressly
authorized exception to section 2283, but cast the deciding votes denying
that the bringing of the Illinois suit was not a
the injunction 19 on the ground 20
Act.
Sherman
the
violation of
12. Id. at 1055; 403 F. Supp. at 536. Before Vendo, few courts squarely faced the issue of
whether § 16 is an exception to § 2283. A few lower courts have denied § 16 injunctions against
state court actions, but they have generally done so on the grounds that the state action sought
to be enjoined is not a violation of the Sherman Act. See Response of Carolina v. Leasco
Response, Inc., 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Red Rock Cola Co.
v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952); cf. Helfenbein v. International Indus.,
Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 879 (1971) (suggesting that had the state suit
been an antitrust violation, the injunction would have been granted).
13. See note 2 supra. The district court held that collection of the judgment would place
controversy.
the two corporate plaintiffs under Vendo's control, thereby eliminating the case ol"
403 F. Supp. at 535.
14. 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
15. Justices Stewart and Powell.
16. 97 S. Ct. at 2893.
17. Justices Stevens, Brennan, White and Marshall.
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2898 (dissent).
19. The concurrence of Blackmun and Burger created an anomalous result. Six justices
(Blackmun, Burger, Stevens, White, Marshall and Brennan) found § 16 to be an expressly
authorized exception, and seven (Stevens, White, Marshall, Brennan, Rehnquist, Stewart and
Powell) possibly conceded that the state court action could have been found to be a Sherman
Act violation. The plurality opinion did not reach the question. See id. at 2889 n.6. But because
of the three-way split, the injunction was struck down.
20. Id. at 2893-94 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's opinion relies on
Supreme Court cases granting governmental dealings immunity. In Eastern R.R. Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the Court held that political lobbying is not a Sherman
Act violation, even if the political activity incidentally results in a restraint on trade. Individuals
and groups have the right to petition and attempt to influence their government; the Sherman
Act may not interfere with this political sphere. This immunity was extended in UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), to include attempts to influence administrative officials, even
with an anticompetitive intent.
In California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the Court
invoked the "sham" exception recognized by Noerr and limited the immunity. "[T]here may be
instances where the alleged conspiracy 'is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.'"' Id. at 511 (quoting Eastern R.R. Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 144) (citation omitted). The Court distinguished the
political campaign of Noerr, in which misrepresentation and unethical tactics are to be expected, and the bringing of litigation in CaliforniaTransport:"Misrepresentations, condoned in the
political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." Id. at 513.
Justice Blackmun contended that the present action does not qualify as an exception to the

604
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Congress enacted section 2283 as part of the Judiciary Act of 1793.21
The original provision allowed no exceptions on its face. 22 This seemingly
absolute prohibition did not prevent federal court judges from molding
necessary modifications; injunctive relief under six federal statutes was
universally accepted before 1941.23 Federal courts were also willing to
enjoin state cases involving the same res over which a federal court had first
acquired jurisdiction,2 4 state court judgments obtained by fraud,2 5 and cases
in which parties attempted to litigate issues in state court already decided in
26
federal suits.
In a startling turnabout in 1941, Justice Frankfurter, in his opinion for
the Court in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,27 held that the
statutory exceptions and the res exception were the only ones to be recognized by the federal courts. 28 Congress reacted to this change in judicial
attitude by amending the statute29 to except from the general prohibition
those injunctions "expressly authorized by Act of Congress, 30 or where
immunity conferred under California Transport because "a pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims or some equivalent showing of grave abuse of the state courts must exist before an
injunction would be proper. No such finding was made by the District Court in this case." 97 S.
Ct. at 2893 n.*. This is a narrow reading of California Transport. See Associated Radio Serv.
Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
21. Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334.
22. "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be [granted by any court of the United States) to stay
proceedings in any court of a state .... ." Id.
23. These exceptions were bankruptcy, removal, limitation of shipowner's liability, interpleader, the Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act, and habeas corpus proceedings. See C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 47, at 203 nn.31 & 32 (3d ed. 1976).
24. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
25. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
26. See Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904).
27. 314 U.S. 118 (1941), rev'g on rehearing 313 U.S. 538 (1940) (per curiam) (mem.).
28. Id. at 139. Toucey involved a question of relitigation. Toucey brought an action in
state court against defendant insurance company in 1935 for reinstatement of his insurance
policy on the ground that the company had fraudulently cancelled by concealing from Toucey a
provision that if he were to become disabled, premiums were waived. Toucey claimed he was
disabled in 1933 and that the company cancelled his policy for nonpayment of premiums. The
case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds. The federal district court dismissed the
action, finding that Toucey was not disabled. There was no appeal. Id. at 126-27.
In 1937, Shay, purporting to be Toucey's assignee, brought the same action against the
insurance company in the Missouri state courts. The insurance company brought an action in
the federal district court to enjoin that action and any further actions by Toucey on the policy.
The injunction was granted on the grounds that the federal court had already ruled against
Toucey on the essential question of his purported disability. The district court held that the antiinjunction provision did not bar a federal injunction of state court actions when necessary to
"effectuate the lawful decrees of the federal courts." Id. at 127. The Supreme Court, after
initially affirming by an equally divided vote, 313 U.S. 538 (1940) (per curiam) (mem.), reversed
on rehearing, holding the relitigation exception invalid. 314 U.S. at 139-41.
29. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2283, 62 Stat. 869. The Reviser's Note indicates that
the amendment "restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the
Toucey decision." 28 U.S.C. § 2283, Reviser's Note (1970).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (footnote added). Lektro-Vend claimed, and the district court
found, that an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act is "expressly authorized by Act of
Congress." 403 F. Supp. at 536.
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necessary in aid of [the federal court's] jurisdiction, 3 1 or to protect or
effectuate [the federal court's] judgments.'32
It is this more detailed statute that the Court had to consider in Vendo.
Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court, dealt primarily with the
"expressly authorized" exception of section 2283, which he held inapplicable.33 Justice Rehnquist recognized that a statute need not refer to either
section 2283 or a state court proceeding to qualify as an exception. He
observed, however, that the statutes that have been held exceptions "necessarily interact with or focus upon, a state judicial proceeding." 34 The
removal process, for example, stays state court proceedings by its very
nature. 35 Section 16, by contrast, merely extends to private parties the right
to seek injunctive relief against antitrust violations; it in no way "focuses"
36
upon state court actions.
This requirement of "focus" is closely connected with the test for an
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (footnote added). The Reviser's Note indicates that this
second exception allows injunctions in connection with the removal of actions to federal courts.
Id., Reviser's Note. Justice Rehnquist had a different theory; he cited C. WRIGHT, supra note
23, § 47, at 204, to support his contention that this exception refers to the in rem exception. 97
S. Ct. at 2892.
In Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the
"necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception allowed an injunction "where Congress. . .has
vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject matter and the intrusion of a
state would result in conflict of functions." Id. at 504. Accordingly, the employer was enjoined
by the federal court from enforcing a state court injunction of union activity, clearly not an in
rem action. The Supreme Court again addressed the jurisdiction exception in Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). "[I]t is not enough that
the requested injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but it must be 'necessary in aid of' that
jurisdiction." Id. at 295. The exception implies "that some federal injunctive relief may be
necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or
disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide
that case." Id. As in CapitalService, the case involved the enjoining of union activity, certainly
not a situation involving the in rem exception.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The third exception is designed to prevent relitigation in state
courts of issues already resolved in federal courts-the situation involved in the Toucey case.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 23, § 47, at 204.
33. 97 S. Ct. at 2893. Rehnquist also held that the injunction could not be sustained on §
2283's second exception-that the injunction was necessary in aid of the district court's
jurisdiction. Rehncluist suggested that this language refers only to in rem actions. Id. at 2892.
The Supreme Court, however, has used the exception to allow injunctions of in personam
actions. See note 31 supra. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist is probably correct in his conclusion that the facts of the case do not warrant application of the exception. Even if collection of
the state court judgment were to reduce the corporate plaintiffs to Vendo satellites, Harry
Stoner as an individual plaintiff could preserve the case or controversy, and the court's
jurisdiction would be intact.
34. 97 S. Ct. at 2892.
35. While traditionally the removal of a case from state to federal court stayed all
proceedings in the state court, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1970), in 1977 the statute was amended to
provide in the case of criminal prosecutions that the state court proceeding can continue, but no
judgment of conviction may be entered unless, and until, the federal court denies the removal
petition. Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 3, 91 Stat. 320 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §
1446(c)(3) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977)).
36. 97 S. Ct. at 2888.
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expressly authorized exception developed in Mitchum v. Foster.37 The
Mitchum Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 198338 is an expressly authorized
exception under section 2283. The test articulated by that Court "is whether
an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in
a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay
of a state court proceeding." 39 The Court in Mitchum relied on the legislative history of section 1983, which clearly showed congressional concern
that state courts would be used to deprive citizens of their federally protected
rights.' Because this concern was a basic factor in the enactment of section
1983, the Court found that that provision could realize its "intended scope"
only if federal courts held injunctive power over state court actions that
41
violate it.
Because Congress was not overtly concerned with state court proceedings as violative of the Sherman Act when it enacted section 16 of the
Clayton Act, Justice Rehnquist denied the existence of an exception on the
ground that "[t]he critical aspects of the legislative history . . . are wholly
absent . . . . This void is not filled by other evidence of congressional
authorization. "42 Rehnquist rejected the possibility that the strong congressional policy and national interest in enforcing the antitrust laws could
conceivably fill the void.4 3 He instead maintained that "the importance of
the federal policy to be 'protected' by the injunction is not the focus of the
inquiry."44 Citing two earlier Supreme Court cases,4 5 he warned that section
2283 is not a principle of comity and federalism that allows federal courts to
balance federal and state interests, but a strict prohibition to be guarded from
46
judicial improvisation.
In the first of the cases cited by Rehnquist, Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America v. Richman Brothers Co., 7 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, held that a district court could not restrain a state court
from enjoining a labor union engaged in peaceful picketing. 48 Frankfurter
37. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13).
39. 407 U.S. at 238.

40. Id. at 240-42 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 361,374-76, 385, 416, 429,653
(1871)).
41.

Id. at 242-43.

42. 97 S. Ct. at 2888-89.
43.

Id. at 2889.

44. Id.
45. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970);
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).

46. 97 S. Ct. at 2893.
47. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).

48. The Court recognized that the state court had intruded into the federal domain created
by the Taft-Hartley Act. The suit, however, was brought by the union, a private party, and
therefore did not qualify as an express exception. Id. at 517. Section 101, § 10(j), (1) of the
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rejected the union's argument that the section 2283 bar applied only to cases
in which the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, finding
the "[l]egislative policy . . . expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified
only by specifically defined exceptions." 49 As section 2283 did not specifically list exclusive federal jurisdiction as one of its exceptions, the prohibition against injunctions applied.50
The second case Justice Rehnquist relied on, Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,51 also involved a labor
dispute. Again the Court denied federal power to restrain a state court
injunction against union picketing. Justice Black reiterated the Court's
position-a federal court may not interfere in a state court action "merely
because those proceedings interfere with a protected federal right or invade
an area preempted by federal law, even when the interference is unmistakably clear.' '52 The Court rejected the contention that the Act merely establishes a principle of comity; any injunction against state court proceedings
53
had to be based on a section 2283 exception.
Justice Stevens, speaking for the dissenters in Vendo, distinguished
that case from Atlantic CoastLine and Richman on the ground that neither
considered an allegation of an exception expressly authorized by act of
Congress. 54 Stevens was not trying to create an extrastatutory exception
based on the importance of federal antitrust policy, the sort of judicial
improvisation condemned by Atlantic CoastLine and Richman. Instead, he
argued that the language and history of the Clayton Act warrant a holding
that an injunction against state court action under section 16 is expressly
authorized by act of Congress, and is thus an exception included within the
55
language of section 2283.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the antitrust laws to evidence a
congressional desire for strong enforcement against violations in whatever
guise. 56 Stevens contended that this policy, coupled with the grant of federal
injunctive power in section 16, 57 constitutes an expressly authorized exception. 58 The language of the Sherman Act defining violations is deliberately
vague and intended to include "every conceivable act which could possibly
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (I) (1970), authorizes

injunctive relief only at the request of the NLRB.
49. 348 U.S. at 515-16.
50. Id. at 515-18.

51. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
52. Id. at 294.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 286-87.
97 S. Ct. at 2899 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
rd. at 2894-98.
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
See note 3 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2896-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law," 59 whether
or not the form of restraint was actually contemplated by Congress. From
this basis, Stevens reasoned that section 16 allows injunctions against
"violations of the Sherman Act," it has been judicially established that state
court actions may be such violations, 6° and therefore section 16 allows
injunctions against state court actions. 61 Stevens also maintained that the
statute qualifies as an exception under the Mitchum test. 62 Section 16 was
enacted to give private citizens an antitrust remedy before a violation
produces irreparable harm. 63 This "intended scope" will be defeated unless
the federal courts can restrain state court actions such as the Illinois action in
Vendo that cause such harm in violation of the Sherman Act. 64
Justice Stevens was accurate in his observation that neither Richman
nor Atlantic Coast Line dealt with situations involving the "expressly
authorized" exception to section 2283. The broad holding of both opinions
was that if an injunction cannot be classified under one of the stated
exceptions (as exclusive federal jurisdiction could not in these cases), the
prohibition is absolute. 6 These cases, however, should not be summarily
59. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
60. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972)
("concerted action . . . to institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat applications . . . to acquire operating rights"); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp.
451, 451 (D. Minn. 1973) ("repetitive use of litigation . . . timed and designed principally to
prevent the establishment of municipal electric systems and thereby preserve defendant's
monopoly").
61. 97 S. Ct. at 2898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2899-901; see text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
63. 97 S. Ct. at 2900.
64. Id.
65. But see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (recognizing that federal intervention may be appropriate if the state court action is in bad faith, for the purposes of harassment
and threatens irreparable harm that is "'both great and immediate'" through violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926))). Justice
Stewart in his Mitchum decision noted the inconsistency of Younger with Atlantic Coast Line
and held that the portion of Younger recognizing an exception when the state court action
threatens constitutional rights would have to be overruled if § 1983 were not "expressly
authorized." 407 U.S. at 231; see text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
A second extrastatutory exception was established by the Supreme Court in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), and reaffirmed in NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404
U.S. 138 (1971). Both cases allowed an injunction of state court actions when the United States
as sovereign is the party seeking injunctive relief. The Leiter court upheld the injunction on the
ground that when the United States seeks a stay to prevent injury to a national interest, there is
less danger of state-federal conflict than there is when a private party is plaintiff. 352 U.S. at
225-26. Nash extended "sovereignty" to the NLRB as a public agency acting in the public
interest-the chosen instrument of protection. The rationale for this extension was that § 2283's
purpose is not "the frustration of federal systems of regulation." 404 U.S. at 146.
In Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit held that the
Leiter/Nash implied sovereignty exception should make the § 2283 bar inapplicable when the
federal action is based on a federal statute designed to protect the public sector through the
creation of private claims for relief. Id. at 697-98. The Studebaker court allowed an injunction
under § 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(e) (Supp. V 1975); the
court implied that the same result would be reached if the federal action were based on § 16 of
the Clayton Act. 360 F.2d at 698; cf. Tampa Phosphate R.R. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 418
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dismissed as totally inapplicable to the Vendo case. Together with Mitchurn, they are the most important indications of the Court's interpretation of
the 1948 amendment of section 2283, and their tone is restrictive. Dictum in
Atlantic Coast Line indicates that that Court was also concerned with
unwarranted expansion of the three exceptions beyond the scope of
Congress' intent. 6
Section 16 can, nevertheless, reasonably be found to be within the
scope of the section 2283 "expressly authorized" exception. Since 1793,
the Supreme Court has been more willing to except federal statutes from
section 2283's prohibition than Justice Rehnquist's requirement of "focus"
suggests, a tradition continued by Mitchum. Six statutes 67 were "implied
exceptions" before Toucey, and were retained even by that restrictive
opinion. 68 After the Toucey decision, the Supreme Court in two cases 69
established a seventh statutory exception-the Emergency Price Control
Act,7 ° which, as Justice Rehnquist conceded, does not "focus" on a state
court action.

71

The 1948 revision of section 2283 was not meant to restrict these
exceptions, but rather to return the law to the more liberal interpretations of
the pre-Toucey decisions. 72 Furthermore, the 1948 revision, as evidenced
by Mitchum, was not meant to restrict statutory exceptions to those already
recognized. The Mitchum Court's basis for finding section 1983 to be an
express exception was the legislative intent and history behind the statute; 73
the history of the Clayton Act provides a similar basis.
In 1914, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to strict enforcement of
the antitrust laws with the passage of the Clayton Act. 74 Section 16 expressly granted federal injunctive relief to private citizens to allow them to protect
themselves from violations of the Sherman Act before suffering financial
ruin. 75 Congress may not have been specifically concerned with state court
F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970) (same result and reasoning under the
Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, pt. 1, § 1,24 Stat. 379 (1887) (formerly codified, as amended,

at 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970)) (repealed 1976)).
Justice Stevens observed that United States Attorneys acting under the Sherman Act can
ask for injunctions against violations, including state court actions. As the Clayton Act was to
extend to private parties the same litigation powers possessed by the government, it is an
expressly authorized exception. 97 S. Ct. at 2896 nn.9 & 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. 398 U.S. at 287.
67. See note 23 supra.
68. See 314 U.S. at 139.
69. Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
70. Ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23 (1942). The act authorized the Price Administrator to apply
to the "appropriate court" for an injunction against "any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation of any provision . . . of this Act." Id.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2892 n.10.
72. See note 29 supra.
73. 407 U.S. at 242.
74. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
75. 97 S. Ct. at 2897 n.I I (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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actions as violations, but, as subsequent case law recognized, Congress
deliberately defined Sherman Act violations generally to cover all attempts
at circumvention of tie Act's prohibitions.7 6 Congress intended its grant of
private federal injunctive relief to be broad enough to curtail all attempts to
restrain trade illegally. To limit this relief by holding the section 2283 bar
applicable to section 16 would infringe on the intended scope of the statute;
thus, section 16 appears to satisfy the Mitchum test and should qualify as an
expressly authorized exception to section 2283.
Although plaintiffs lost their injunction, Vendo's impact will not
seriously weaken the antitrust laws; a majority of the justices held that
section 16 is an express exception under section 2283.11 Nor should the
decision cause state courts to fear a steady stream of encroachments on their
freedom from review by federal district courts; the opinion advocating the
exception focused-on the unique nature of the antitrust laws. 78 The Vendo
decision does, however; raise the question of the continuing usefulness of
section 2283, particularly in its present form, as a mechanism for preventing
needless friction between state and federal courts.
The likely effect of the decision is to allow Lektro-Vend's probably
meritorious7 9 antitrust claim to go unheard. In issuing its injunction, the
district court was not attempting to review the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court; the injunction was issued to temporarily restrain collection
of the judgment against Lektro-Vend to allow the company sufficient independence and financial resources to press its antitrust claim.8 0 Denying the
federal courts the latitude to hear a complaint grounded on a matter within
exclusive federal jurisdiction for the sake of immediate enforcement of a
state court judgment seems to be an inappropriate method of avoiding
conflict between the two judicial systems.
Justice Rehnquist refused to balance the importance of the federal
policies behind the Anti-Injunction Act and the antitrust laws, stating that
Congress, in enacting section 2283, reserved this judgment for itself.8 1 His
refusal, although supported by the language of Atlantic Coast Line and
Richman82 and a fair reading of the language of section 2283, is founded on
a uniquely inflexible interpretation of the statute. Even Justice Frankfurter,
author of the Toucey and Richman opinions, was willing to allow an extrastatutory exception, when he recognized the implied sovereignty excep83
tion.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See United States, v. American Tobacco'Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
See note 19 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2895-901 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. at 532.
See id. at 535.
97 S. Ct. at 2891.
See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
Leiter Minerals. Inc. v. United States. 352 U.S. 220 (1957). The exception was not
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In addition, Congress, by allowing exceptions to its original flat prohibition, 84 recognized that there are federal policies that supersede that of
the Anti-Injunction Act. The question is whether the determination of what
these policies are is strictly reserved to Congress. The Reviser's Note
indicates that section 2283 was amended to restore the state of the law to the
more liberal pre-Toucey era.8 5 If this was indeed Congress' intention, the
language of the statute enumerating acceptable exceptions and the Court's
conclusion that these exceptions are to be construed narrowly, may have
circumvented it. The language of the statute was tailored to one restrictive
Supreme Court decision and was intended to expand rather than contract
allowable section 2283 exceptions.8 6 A literal reading of the language of
section 2283, particularly in light of Atlantic Coast Line and Richman, has
87
not led to this result.
The strongest protection the states have against federal interference
with their judicial proceedings is the self-restraint federal courts exercise in
deference to the concept of federalism. 88 During the early years of the
judiciary's growth, the Anti-Injunction Act may have been necessary to
define the state-federal judicial relationship and to emphasize to the federal
court judges that they were not to attempt any review function over state
court proceedings. The Act has served its purpose. Federal courts generally
recognize that even when an injunction is permissible under section 2283,
the court must determine whether such an injunction would violate general
89
principles of comity and federalism.
The Anti-Injunction Act was revised by Congress in 1948 and must be
adhered to by the federal courts. It is questionable, however, how effective
the provision is in its function of preserving state-federal relations. Justice
Frankfurter called section 2283 "continuing evidence of [Congress'] confidence in the state courts

.

.

.

to recognize the rather subtle line of demarca-

tion between exclusive federal and allowable state jurisdiction.'

'9

State-

only reaffirmed, but extended after the Atlantic Coast Line decision. NLRB v. Nash-Finch

Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); see note 65 supra.
84. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 29 supra.See also Durfee & Sloss, FederalInjunctionAgainst Proceedingsin

State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 1145, 1169 (1932). The authors
concluded that at the time they were writing, the Anti-Injunction Act provided no more
protection to state court independence than did recognized principles of comity and federalism.

They evidenced no sense of alarm or impropriety at this state of affairs.
86. See note 29 supra.

87. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
88. Between 1793 and 1941 the federal courts found it necessary to except only six federal
statutes from the prohibition. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.

89. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc., 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.
1952); Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
90. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. at 518-19.
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federal relations would have been spared the confines of the strained
construction of section 2283 if Congress had evidenced the same confidence
in the federal courts.
MARY BROOKE LAMSON

Prisoners' Rights-Bowring v. Godwin: The Limited Right of

State Prisoners to Psychological and Psychiatric Treatment
According to statistics compiled by the American Correctional Association, between fifteen and twenty percent of the prisoner population in the
United States suffers from a diagnosable emotional or mental disturbance,
including neuroses, personality and behavioral disorders, and various prepsychotic and psychotic conditions. ' And yet, historically, the vast majority
of these prisoners have remained untreated due to an inadequacy of staff and
facilities, 2 as well as a general apathy towards the mental health of convicted
criminals.' In Bowring v. Godwin,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit expressly held that in certain narrowly defined situations
there is a definite nexus between the constitutional right of a prisoner to be
spared from cruel and unusual punishment5 and his right to receive psychological and/or psychiatric treatment. 6 According to the court, however, not
1. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 441
(3d ed. 1966). See also Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 948 (1975); Alexander, The Captive Patient: The Treatment of Health Problems in
American Prisons, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 16 (1972) (persons entering the federal prison
system have a 5% chance of severe psychiatric disturbance and 15% chance of serious
emotional disability).
2. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS (1972),

reprintedin ABA COMM.

ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, MEDICAL AND HEALTH

CARE IN JAILS, PRISONS, AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

67

(3d

ed. 1974); ArrICA:

THE

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972); SOUTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, SUMMARY OF SYSTEM AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF

MEDICAL SERVICES IN SOUTH CAROLINA CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM (1974), reprinted in

ABA

at 263.
3. See Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784 (1969);
Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment, II Am. CRIM. L. REV. 7
COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, supra

(1972). Behavior modification has received the most attention in recent years as a form of
treatment. This treatment is intended to conform behavior patterns to a socially acceptable
norm, not to discover and combat the root causes of mental illness. See O'Brien, Tokens and

Tiers in Corrections:An Analysis of Legal Issues in BehaviorModification, 3 NEW ENGLAND J.
PRISON L. 15 (1976).
4. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII in pertinent part provides: "[N]or [shall] cruel and unusual
punishments [be] inflicted."

6. 551 F.2d at 47-48.
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every deprivation of such treatment rises to the level of a constitutional
violation. 7 As a result of this qualification, the role of the federal-courts in
alleviating the mental health problems among state prisoners remains somewhat limited.'
Plaintiff Bowring, an inmate in the Virginia State Prison System,
asserted a constitutional right to receive psychological diagnosis and treatment in light of the fact that his application for parole was denied at least
partially because of the results of a psychological evaluation indicating that
"Bowring would not successfully complete a parole period." 9 Bowring
maintained that the state must provide him with appropriate treatment with
the aim that he be cured of the mental aberration that rendered him ineligible
for parole. He based this assertion on a claim that the denial of such
treatment constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the
eighth amendment and "a denial of due process of law" in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 10
The district court construed Bowring's petition for relief as an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,11 but summarily dismissed the action on the
ground that he had failed to allege a denial of any constitutional right. 12 The
court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Bowring's constitutional
right to essential medical care had been violated by the prison officials'
refusal to grant his request for psychological treatment. The court found no
reason for distinguishing "between the right to medical care for physical ills
and its psychological or psychiatric counterpart, 13 and, accordingly, ruled
that the complaint should not have been dismissed without first determining
whether Bowring was, in fact, suffering from a "qualified" mental illness
and therefore entitled to treatment. 14
Specifically, the court held that every prison inmate is entitled to
psychological and/or psychiatric treatment
7. Id. at 48; accord, Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(mistreatment or nontreatment must be characterized as cruel and unusual punishment in order
to raise a constitutional question).
8. See Comment, The Rights of Prisonersto Medical Careand the Implicationsfor DrugDependent Prisonersand Pre-TrialDetainees, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 712-18 (1975).
9. 551 F.2d at 46. The exact nature of Bowring's illness is not evident from the record.

10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.
12. 551 F.2d at 46.
13. Id. at 47.
14. Id. at 49.
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if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary
skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable
medical certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or
may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm
to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be
substantial. 15
The court went on to hold, however, that the deprivation of appropriate
treatment for such a "qualified" mental illness will not always give rise to a
complaint actionable under section 1983. First, the denial of treatment will
not be actionable unless it is the direct result of deliberate indifference on the
part of prison officials. 16 Second, the denial of treatment may be justified in
certain situations because of the unreasonable costs involved or the disproportionate amount of time that would be required to complete a particular
course of treatment. 1 7 In addition, the court further limited the scope of the
prisoner's right to treatment by expressly disavowing any attempt to "second-guess" the propriety or adequacy of the type of treatment the prison
8
medical officer might choose to prescribe.'
The court based this limited right to treatment primarily on the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, recognizing
that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners results
in an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering that is totally
divorced from any legitimate penal interest. 19 The court also noted that its
holding was premised upon the notion that psychological treatment is an
20
integral part of the rehabilitation process.
Though this standard for invoking the right to psychological and/or
psychiatric treatment may seem excessively restrictive, it is for the most part
consistent with the standards that have developed in the general area of
medical care for prisoners. It is now well established that a prisoner's access
to the federal courts for the protection of his constitutional rights is not
foreclosed by the mere fact of his incarceration. 2 1 Nevertheless, the vestiges
of the old "hands-off" doctrine2 2 are still evident in the efforts of the courts
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id. at 48.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
20. Id. at 48 n.2 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)). The Court in Pell noted that
rehabilitation is one of the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system, the
others being deterrence, protection of society and the internal security of the corrections
facilities themselves. 417 U.S. at 823.
21. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,821-22 (1977); Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546
(1940); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
22. The "hands off" doctrine refers to the general reluctance of federal courts to intervene in the internal affairs of state prisons. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
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to limit that accessibility by defining narrowly the circumstances under
which a denial of treatment will be considered a constitutional violation.
The Supreme CourtP and all of the circuits2 4 are in essential agreement that
state prison officials possess broad discretion in determining the nature of
the medical care afforded inmates25 and that intervention by the federal
courts is warranted only when there has been either a deliberate denial of
essential treatment for serious illnesses and injuries 26 or such drastically
insufficient or inappropriate care as to be the equivalent of intentional
mistreatment. 27 Complaints alleging mere negligence 28 or the inefficacy of a
particular course of treatment 29 do not, by contrast, raise an issue of
constitutional dimension and, therefore, are not cognizable under section
1983. In short, if it appears that the prison officials have made a good faith
effort to deal with the medical problems of the prisoner, the constitutional
30
requirements have been satisfied.
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Estelle v. Gamble3' is
representative of the result that ensues when this medical care standard is
applied. Plaintiff in Estelle filed suit against prison officials after being
denied proper medical treatment for a back injury. He had persisted for three
months in asking for proper diagnosis and treatment, but during that time the
medical personnel refused to prescribe any treatment other than pain pills
and muscle relaxants. 32 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to allege a
violation of his constitutional rights. The Court emphasized that plaintiff
had seen various medical personnel on seventeen occasions during the thiee33
month period and that he had not been denied "treatment" for his ailment.
Though acknowledging that plaintiff might have an action in tort for medical
23. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see text accompanying notes 31-34 infra.
24. See United States v. Fitzgerald, 466 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Page v. Sharpe,
487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974);
Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421

U.S. 948 (1975); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d
151, 158 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 419 U.S. 813, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974);
Wibron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 1975); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th

Cir. 1970); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 881-82 (10th Cir. 1974).
25. See, e.g., Ross v. Bounds, 373 F. Supp. 450, 452-53 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
26. See, e.g., Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D. Md. 1975).
27. See, e.g., Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 419
U.S. 813, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970).
28. See, e.g., Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1973); Swain v. Garribrant,
354 F. Supp. 631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
29. E.g., Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1970).
30. See, e.g., Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
32. Id. at 107.
33. See id. The Court did not disagree with plaintiff's conteniion that the seriousness of

his back injury may have warranted further diagnosis and treatment. Rather: the Court maintained that this was a question of medical judgment and, therefore, a matter of medical

malpractice and not cruel and unusual punishment.
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malpractice, the Court refused to classify the treatment
provided by prison
34
medical personnel as "deliberate indifference. "
The standards that evolved in the area of medical care have been
applied in the past to specific cases involving the alleged denial of psychological and psychiatric treatment. 35 For instance, in Greear v. Loving,36
plaintiff alleged that he had never been afforded the opportunity to see a
psychiatrist to determine if any treatment was available for his emotional
problems. The district court ordered a psychiatric evaluation in which it was
determined that he was, indeed, suffering from emotional instability, immaturity and impulsivity. The examining psychiatrist concluded, however,
that there was no need for any treatment at that time. 37 The court then
dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had already been
afforded sufficient medical care for his essential needs. 38 In Davis v.
Schmidt, 39 plaintiff was examined by a psychiatrist on several occasions,
but the only treatment that he received was medication intended to neutralize
temporarily the manifested symptoms of the mental illness.4 0 Plaintiff's
petition requesting actual psychiatric treatment was denied on the ground
that he had alleged only a disagreement with the psychiatrist over the
propriety of the medically acceptable course of treatment that had been
41
prescribed for him.
Greear and Davis are representative of the results that a prisoner
requesting treatment for mental health problems might expect. Often, it will
be determined that the prisoner's mental or emotional problem is not serious
enough to warrant treatment. 42 In the case of those prisoners whose illnesses
cannot be ignored because of the threat posed to the orderly administration
of the correctional institution, the treatment prescribed may be intended
merely to eliminate the threat by directly combating the symptoms of the
43
mental illness rather than attacking the cause.
The most significant developments in the field of prisoner health care
have occurred in cases in which federal courts have ordered systematic
44
improvements in the conditions under which prisoners are confined.
34. Id. at 106.

35. See, e.g., Flint v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1970); Bishop v. Cox, 320 F.
Supp. 1031 (W.D. Va. 1970).
36. 391 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Va. 1975).
37. Id. at 1271.
38. Id.
39. 57 F.R.D. 37 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
40. Id. at 40. Tranquilizers were the medication prescribed. Plaintiff was also placed on a
waiting list for group therapy.
41. Id. at 41; see text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
43. All too frequently the treatment imposed on seriously disturbed inmates is directed at

pacification only. For a general overview of the treatment provided for prisoners, see Morris,
supra note 3; Prettyman, supra note 3.
44. STee,
e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
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Though allowing for the necessity that prison officials retain some discretion
in the administration of medical resources, these courts have held that an
unreasonable deficiency in staff and facilities is tantamount to deliberate
indifference to the predictable health care needs of the prisoners .45 Yet even
these cases have stopped short of setting forth either the degree of care that
would satisfy the minimum constitutional requirements or the applicable
standards to be followed in determining under what circumstances psychological and/or psychiatric treatment is mandated.4 6 There has been no
systematic attempt to provide mental health programs for the general inmate
population, even though such programs will assuredly be necessary to deal
effectively with a problem that is so prevalent in the prison systems. 47 In
essence, the right to treatment recognized in these cases does very little to
remove the obstacles that stand in the way of the individual inmate48 who
desires therapeutic treatment for his mental and emotional problems.
In Bowring v. Godwin,4 the court declined to extend the right of
prisoners to receive psychological and/or psychiatric treatment beyond the
generally accepted limits exemplified by Greear,Davis and similar cases. If
anything, the court in Bowring established an even more restrictive standard
for invoking the right to treatment. Aside from the typical medical care
requirements that a serious disease or injury be involved and that the
requested treatment be a matter of medical necessity and not merely desirable, the court restricted the right to treatment by excluding those prisoners
5°
whose illnesses are incurable or incapable of being substantially alleviated
and by not requiring any treatment that might be considered too costly or too
time-consuming.5"
It is indeed reasonable that prison officials should not be charged with
948 (1975) (court ordered hiring of additional medical personnel); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d

1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (court ordered hiring of additional medical personnel, compliance with
American Correctional Association standards relating to medical services for prisoners and
compliance with state licensing requirements for hospital and infirmary); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (court ordered prompt action to
protect lives, safety and health of prisoners without dealing specifically with improvements in

health care).
45. E.g., Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1226 (2d Cir. 1974).
46. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1332 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421

U.S. 948 (1975). The court found that the medical care available in the Alabama prison system
was barbarous and shocking to the conscience. Id. at 1330 & n. 14. One factor that contributed

to this conclusion was the lack of care provided for mentally disturbed inmates. Despite the
seriousness of the situation, the state provided the services of only a single part-time clinical
psychologist. The court found such inadequate care to be unconstitutional. Id. at 1333. The

court, however, went no further than to order the prison officials to hire additional medical
personnel.
47. See Comment, supra note 8.
48. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
49. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).

50. Id. at 47.
51.

officials.

Id. at 48. Apparently, these determinations are to be left to the discretion of prison
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the obligation of treating the untreatable. 52 It is, however, certainly not
unreasonable to require them to provide such other rudimentary care as may
be needed.53 The Supreme Court has recognized that the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is intended to
protect prisoners from the unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering. 54 If
such pain and suffering is the result of an untreated medical ailment and can
be alleviated in whole or part, it should be irrelevant whether that ailment is
ultimately incurable. Moreover, when mental illness is involved, the incurable illness exception to the right to treatment makes it far too easy to
discriminate unfairly against unfavored inmates by labeling them "untreatable." 55 Without some check on this power to arbitrarily refuse to treat, the
prisoner's right to mental health care may be converted into a privilege that
must be earned by compliance with the regulations of the prison system.
The court's decision limiting the right to treatment on a cost and time
basis is inconsistent with better reasoned prior case law. It has become an
axiom of constitutional law that constitutional rights cannot be withheld due
to a lack of economic resources. 56 For example, in Holt v. Sarver,57 the
district court rejected the argument that wholesale improvements in prison
conditions were impossible until the legislatures appropriate more funds.
Instead, it held that the minimum constitutional requirements must be
unconditionally satisfied. 58 It follows, then, that the right to treatment
should not be conditioned on the length of time required or the cost
involved. As the court in Bowring noted, "[T]he essential test is one of
medical necessity." ' 59 If the illness in question qualifies as a medical
necessity, the appropriate treatment should be provided regardless of
whether that treatment consists of first-aid or long term chemotherapy. This
restriction on the right to treatment is especially critical in the area of mental
health care where a substantial amount of time is usually required for any
treatment to be effective.
Perhaps the most restrictive aspect of the court's holding is the express
refusal to entertain any complaints regarding the adequacy of a particular
52. With the continuing advances being made in medical science, it may be irresponsible
to label any mental illness "incurable" or "untreatable."
53. Hutchens v. Alabama, 466 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1972) (terminally ill inmate alleged a lack

of medical attention and medication needed to relieve temporarily his pain and suffering).
54. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104.

55. See Stokes v. Institutional Bd. of Patuxent, 357 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D. Md. 1973)
(plaintiff returned to the regular prison system after being diagnosed as untreatable).

56. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963); Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y.

1973).
57. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
58. Id.at 379.
59. 551 F.2d at 48. A medical necessity is just that, a necessity. The type of treatment

required should not determine whether that necessity will go untreated.
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course of treatment.' According to the court, the Constitution requires that
only the barest minimums be satisfied. 6 1 The actual quality of the treatment
prescribed is not subject to attack. Only such intentional deprivations as
would be shocking to the conscience are unconstitutional. 62 Under this
standard, a prisoner is entitled to some, but not the best or even an effective,
treatment. 63 For all practical purposes, even the most rudimentary medical
care facilities will meet the constitutional minimums. 64 Once again, the net
effect of this limitation on the right to treatment may be to allow prison
officials to abuse their discretion by treating truly adequate mental health
care as a privilege rather than a right.
Admittedly, there are good reasons for limiting access to the federal
courts in regard to alleged denials of prisoners' rights to psychological
and/or psychiatric treatment. Courts are naturally unwilling to presume that
prison officials intentionally mistreat the inmates in their charge. Without
some prior indication of bad faith, they are understandably reluctant to
undertake the difficult task of examining prisoners' complaints regarding
conditions of confinement. 65 Moreover, the federal courts generally do not
wish to intervene in the affairs of a state prison when the only issue involves
a difference of opinion between a prisoner and a presumably qualified
medical officer. 66 This reluctance has probably been accentuated by the
many frivolous complaints with which the courts have been deluged. 67
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the major effect of these limitations
is to entrust the prisoners' constitutional right to all types of medical care to
the nearly unreviewable discretion of a few prison officials. 68 Though courts
60. Id.
61. Id.; see, e.g., McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1975) (confinement in a
primitive isolation cell was insufficient treatment for mentally-disturbed inmate); Newman v.
Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1333 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (more than one
part-time psychologist is required for a prison population as large as that of Alabama).
62. 551 F.2d at 48; see, e.g., Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 419 U.S. 813, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974);Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626
(9th Cir. 1970). The treatment must be within the realm of legitimate medical judgment.
63. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (hospital need not
show that the treatment will cure or even improve involuntarily committed mental patient's
condition, but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so); Stokes v. Institutional Bd. of
Patuxent, 357 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D. Md. 1973).
64. See Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
65. See, e.g., Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1973); Cates v. Ciccone, 422
F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970).
66. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (citing Shields v.
Kunkel, 442 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971)).
67. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970); United Slates exrel. Hyde v.
McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970).
68. At least one commentator has suggested that this problem of excessive discretion
could be eliminated by court-appointed medical review boards composed of qualified phygicians or by permitting inmates to be examined by privately retained physicians. This last
suggestion, however, may be subject to criticism as a denial of equal protection insofar as some
inmates would not be able to afford private care. See SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED

(1972).
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may not wish to assume that that discretion is being abused, the incontrovertible fact is that the quality of health care provided in the correctional
institutions of this country is "shockingly substandard. "69
The only effective means of dealing with the various mental and
emotional problems that are so widespread among prisoners is to develop a
systematic mental health care program within the prison system. Certainly
such a program would be consistent with the goal of rehabilitation that
served as one of the premises for the Bowring court's recognition of the
right to treatment.70 Given that rehabilitation is one of the avowed purposes
of incarceration 7 and that prisoners are constitutionally entitled to essential
medical care, 72 it would seem both logical and practical that they should be
entitled to the type of long term psychological and/or psychiatric treatment
that may be necessary to help them cope with the pressures of society when
they are released from prison.7 3 Indeed, it is difficult to identify the point at
which psychological treatment ceases to be concerned with the limited goal
of curing a particular mental or emotional disturbance and begins to be
concerned with general rehabilitation. 74 Unfortunately, the federal courts
have consistently adhered to the view that the failure of prison officials to
provide inmates with rehabilitative programs does not, in itself, constitute
75
cruel and unusual punishment.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Trop v. Dulles76 that the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment must be
interpreted in light of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society," 77 it is doubtful that the constitutional
standards for mental health care will ever evolve beyond the minimum
69.

KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONER'S RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 180

(1976). For example, while the warden of North Carolina's Central Prison, Sam P. Garrison,
believes that the prison hospital "is one of the finest in a prison in the United States," the
prison system's chief of health and food services, Richard A. Keil, acknowledges that the
facilities do not come close to meeting the state's own hospital licensing standards. Nichols,
Health Care Behind Bars:A Diagnosis, Raleigh, N.C., News & Observer, Mar. 20, 1977, § IV,
at , col. I.
Efforts are, however, being made to rectify this situation. In November 1977, the Division

of Mental Health Services of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources entered into
a preliminary agreement with the Department of Corrections to assist in formulating an
effective plan for the delivery of mental health care to the inmate population. Memorandum of
Understanding Between North Carolina Department of Corrections and North Carolina Department of Human Resources (Nov. 29, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review).
70.
71.
241, 248
72.

551 F.2d at 48.
See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
(1949); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 420 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

73. See Comment, supra note 8.
74. Id. at 720.
75. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F. Supp. 526, 528 (W.D. Va. 1974).
76. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
77. Id. at 101.
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guidelines enunciated in Bowring v. Godwin.78 As for now, the best hope of
implementing a meaningful right to psychological and/or psychiatric diagnosis and treatment appears to be suits under state administrative procedure
acts to compel compliance with the state correctional statutes that recognize,
in varying degrees, the general rehabilitative aim of incarceration. 79 Until\
such time as some effective means is found to implement such a right to
treatment, the general mental health problems of state prisoners are likely to
be ignored.80
STEVEN L. HOARD
78. But see James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (because of this
evolving standard of decency from which the eighth amendment draws its meaning, a federal
court may rule on whether lack of rehabilitative programs constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment even though other courts have previously ruled that it did not); Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. at 379 ("This Court knows that a sociological theory or idea may ripen into constitutional law.").
79. See Comment, A Statutory Right to Treatment for Prisoners:Society's Right of SelfDefense, 50 NEB. L. REv. 543 (1971). Though most states have enacted legislation defining the
general standard of medical care to be provided in the state's prisons, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §
148-36 (Cum. Supp. 1977), the coverage is frequently incomplete and the wording vague80. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 742, 753-54 (1969)
("We may soon realize that the necessities of life are a matter of personal right and societal
duty, and not a bounty at all. Mental health is the most basic of these necessities. We owe it to
every man.").
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